Cure the Disease, Not the Symptoms

The Prescription

Immigration Reform has long been an issue on the lips of President Bush, with the proposed solution remaining relatively unchanged by time. While the legislation that is eventually passed will surely differ from Bush’s proposal, his plan does address the basic issues that most often arise during debate on the topic. The plan is one of five points, and it breaks down as follows;

1) Secure the Borders. This is to be achieved via increased manpower, increased funding and increased patrols. The White House likes to boast of an increase of 4,000 border agents on the payroll while vowing that, by 2008, the number will swell further, from its current 13,000 to a robust 18,000. They also cite an increase of 6,700 in the number of “detention beds.”

2) Create a Temporary Worker Program. The specifics of such a program are left to future deliberations, but such a program would aim at reducing the number trying to jump the border, encouraging them to instead queue up for the legal route.

3) Hold Employers Accountable for Hired Workers. Bush has called for the creation of a tamper-proof identification card for legal foreign workers, thereby making verification of worker status easier on employers. With the process simplified, and employers no longer able to plead ignorance to a worker’s status, enforcement will become more severe. Some in congress have floated the idea of an implantable RIF chip in migrant worker’s arms. Let’s hope this idea is a stillbirth.

4) Resolve Status of Illegals; President Bush is categorically against an amnesty. Those who want to stay will have to pay a penalty of time and money before being allowed to apply for citizenship. Payment of back-taxes, as well as English language skills, will be required. Those who have “played by the rules” will receive priority over any person who has previously entered illegally.

5) Assimilation Assistance. In June, 2006, Bush created a task force to address this facet of the plan. Methods of integrating immigrants into the communities, specifically schools and churches, seem to be at the forefront of the emerging plan.

What the Prescription Lacks

Most deem the above a rational strategy to adopt, a happy middle ground between amnesty and lockdown which avoids the sort of shameful extreme exhibited by the 109th Congress’ wall. It does, however, have its critics. Some find it too lax, some too tight. Notably absent from these detractors, however, are those who would fault the plan for having too confined a scope. Why? Immigration is a double-sided issue, inevitably involving a point of departure and a point of destination located in distinct countries, and the above plan only deals with the destination. In order to adequately address the problem, shouldn’t we view the entirety of an illegal immigrant’s journey?

The U.S. does not often miss an opportunity to involve itself in another country’s affairs. Some call it helping, others meddling, but few will deny that the U.S. government likes to shape the world to match a vision, whatever that vision may be. With immigration, however, we see an aberration; despite the legitimate platform the issue provides for foreign involvement, our men and women in D.C. have become the introspective types, narrowing their focus to things domestic. This is a strange phenomenon, and one worthy of a closer look.

Diagnosis

At the heart of much illegal immigration is a sick state; it is a symptom of an illness. This is not, at first glance, the illness of our own government, whose success in providing a comfortable lifestyle for its citizens makes the shortcomings of others that much starker. It is rather the illness of Latin American governments whose histories are filled with corruption, violence and mismanagement.

Of course, each struggling Latin American country has a unique story of how it arrived where it’s at. But regardless of the narrative, they’ve all arrived at the same general ending; a weak central state, poverty, and an elite political system which excludes the less affluent members. Facing these circumstances; no economic opportunity and, worse yet, few political means by which to change their plight, it is only natural so many are willing to take the risks associated with illegal immigration. It also stands to reason that, if we could ameliorate these problems, so many would not be so willing.

Playing Doctor

This argument will have its fair share of critics, no doubt. “Our aid to Latin America has increased by 50% under Bush’s watch,” they will say. “He recently traveled to the region to re-enforce our ties, and has actively worked to promote free trade agreements. There is only so much we can do.” This is true. We do give aid to Latin America, we do promote free trade agreements in the region, and we have been doing so for decades. But to believe that the failures of South American governments have come in spite of this fact, as though even our benevolence could not save them, is naïve at best.

The sums given to Latin America look generous indeed, totaling about 2 billion dollars a year. But since the Cold War era, when aid was substantially economic and social in nature, aid has become increasingly militarized. What’s more, this military aid is not coming from the State Department, as it usually would, but rather from the Department of Defense. The difference is significant, as the DoD is subject to less congressional oversight, and lies largely outside the reach of human rights conditions set forth in the foreign aid bill. In its infinite wisdom, the DoD interprets the rise of populism, youth gangs, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration as security threats which call for a military response. More effective means of dealing with the problems; improved judicial systems, financing for social, educational and vocational programs, economic development and social safety nets, are being overlooked for military training.

In sum, this means we are working hard to equip militaries that, historically, have been neither friends of the people, nor catalysts for justice and well-being. For proof we can take one aspect of our military training– the former School of the Americas, renamed the Western Hemisphere Center for Security Cooperation. It was initially established in Panama, then relocated to Ft. Benning, GA under the terms of the Panama Canal Treaty. Former Panamanian President Jorge Illueca called the SOA the “biggest base for destabilization in Latin America.” Others call it the School of Assassins. In total the SOA has produced twelve Latin American dictators and thousands of their subordinates. Within Colombia, recipient of more U.S. aid than any other Latin American country, Human Rights Watch has listed 247 violators of human rights. Of those cited, 127 were graduates of the SOA.

Collaboration with our own soldiers, and the U.S. government’s subsequent wish to protect these collaborators, has lead to a ban on certain forms of both economic and military aid to governments who do not enter into “bilateral immunity agreements.” Such agreements exempt U.S. personnel from the ICC’s prosecution of human rights abuses.

At best, the type of aid given above is not very effective in making Latin America a more stable, more appealing place to live. At worst, it is a counter-productive, negative force in Latin American society. But why would the U.S. government contribute to instability in Latin American? Surely a steady influx of labor, eager to work and willing to be exploited, is not reason enough. No, at the heart of our actions in South and Central America is, more likely, what author Doug Stokes calls “the preservation of a status-quo favorable to our interests.” We want Latin American governments who will cooperate with our War on Terror, our War on Drugs, and our War on Socialism. All the above serve our government’s ends, and are enacted with such zeal that the perpetuation of instability becomes a natural byproduct. This has lead Mr. Stokes to add “American Intervention” to our previous list of elements (a weak-central state, poverty, and an elite political system) to be overcome in Latin America.

Finding a Remedy

In the end, this article is, and this public debate should be, about much more than just immigration. While it currently has a grip on the media’s spotlight there are issues which should be coupled with it in all conversations and contexts; the nature of our aid to Latin America, the impact FTAs have upon Latin American populations, our historical role in the region, socialism’s viability as a system to help raise its citizens from poverty, and the needs to be addressed in countries like Mexico, producer of 85% of our illegal immigrants. The occlusion of these issues from any dialogue surrounding immigration should, at the least, raise concerns regarding the intentions of our government. Do we sincerely want to deal with the problem, or do we want to quiet the American masses without staunching the readily available, exploitable labor streaming across our border? Do we want to improve, or just maintain, the less-than satisfactory health of Latin America societies? The confined scope of the debate, as well as our past actions, seems to suggest some sorry answers to these questions.

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