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Getting Out |
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The New York Times comments today on Democratic candidates’ reluctance to actually withdraw troops from Iraq. The top three all advocate leaving an unspecified number of troops.
Interestingly - and unfortunately - the Times depicts Richardson’s strategy of immediate withdrawal and Biden’s partition plan as polar opposites.
Gov. Bill Richardson of New Mexico stands apart, having suggested that he would even leave some military equipment behind to expedite the troop withdrawal. In a forum at a gathering of bloggers last week, he declared: “I have a one-point plan to get out of Iraq: Get out! Get out!â€
On the other side of the spectrum is Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, who has proposed setting up separate regions for the three major ethnic and religious groups in Iraq until a stable central government is established before removing most American troops.
Why is Biden’s plan “the other side of the spectrum”? If a plan such as his were detailed effectively and was able to command the support of regional powers, perhaps a partition of Iraq (say, into three autonomous regions governed by a centralized federal state) and a solution to the conflict could take place very quickly. Setting up a new government, turning power over to a multinational and largely Muslim peacekeeping force, and exiting Iraq with quiet dignity would be much closer to Richardson’s demand for immediate withdrawal than to the top tier candidates’ “strategy” of leaving a large number of troops in the country and having no real plan for getting them out.
The Times practically challenges the antiwar movement to develop an exit strategy:
[The positions of top tier candidates] suggest that the Democratic bumper-sticker message of a quick end to the conflict — however much it appeals to primary voters — oversimplifies the problems likely to be inherited by the next commander in chief. Antiwar advocates have raised little challenge to such positions by Democrats.
There is some truth in this critique: the antiwar movement could do more to define what exactly withdrawal would look like. And so as the movement gears up for a burst of activity around September 15th, I would offer activists two pieces of advice that I intend to follow myself:
1) Be able to discuss the details of how you think we should leave Iraq. Whatever your opinion is, make it an educated one that you could argue for effectively. Without a strategy firmly in hand, we can be shut down all too easily by ripostes like, “Are you saying we should just abandon Iraq/the Iraqis to chaos and civil war?” or “Are you suggesting we should give Iran free rein in Iraq?”
2) Ask questions of all military personnel you have the opportunity to talk with. For one thing, I believe every American should strive to empathize with the soldiers. For another, they do have experiences that are not reported in the media. And for a third, they are our military too: we can tap into their experiences to make our points. And if we allow ourselves to become disconnected from our own troops, we again run the risk of exposing ourselves to cheap shots, namely the charge that we don’t understand the realities on the ground.
If we want withdrawal from Iraq before the end of Bush’s term, we should be able to spell out what that would look like. If we cannot, we risk seeming shrill and ineffectual, capable only of criticizing. And if withdrawal before January 2009 cannot be achieved, then we need to place extreme pressure on all presidential candidates firstly to define - in precise terms - what their strategies would include, and then throw our weight behind those candidates that have serious strategies for quick, efficient, and realistic withdrawal.
Ish, I appreciate your emphasis on the specifics of the exit strategy. It seems many anti-war advocates have adopted “troop withdrawal” as their mantra (without substance), but there are certain complexities to take into consideration. And, of course, as you say, criticizers should offer solutions to the problems they see in Iraq.
To add to your list, though, I would add conversing with Iraqis and other people in Iraq. Such interaction may not be as practical or as easily attainable as the first two, but listening to the concerns of the people the U.S. intends to help should be paramount, along with having a clear plan and seeking input from U.S. military personnel.
Conversing with Iraqis is a good suggestion - I didn’t think of it because personally, I rarely have that opportunity. However, I would qualify that by saying that no one can speak for a whole country - and the interests of rich Iraqis living in the US might be quite different from those of poor ones squatting in bombed-out houses in Baghdad. But yes, hearing Iraqi perspectives is vital - and yet another way to shut down hawks when they claim they’re the only ones who listen to Iraqis.
I’m all for a plan, any plan really, that is controlled by us. Right now, the strategy seems to be let’s wait for the Iraqis to have control, then we’ll leave. That means we’re not controlling the situation, we’re just playing the waiting game, while people die.
Partition Iraq? Fine. Just leave? Fine too. Either way, we’ve got a plan, an objective, more than silly “benchmarks.”
“Just leave” is unrealistic, I think. An Iraq in the full throes of civil war, or rather, a zone of chaos where a country called Iraq used to be, could destabilize the Middle East even further than it already has been. I think we at least need to leave a framework for peace, and ensure that others - the Arab powers, the EU, the UN, Russia, China, whoever - are taking an active hand in getting the situation under control. I don’t think leaving Iraq completely to its own devices is a good idea, because who knows what kind of regime might emerge there.
Unfortunately Ish, as we discussed on the phone yesterday, I’m operating under the understanding that the Bush administration is completely uninterested in taking the necessary steps to leave responsibly. The only way to leave with any hope of success would involve the administration stepping things up diplomatically and bringing disparate parties together to hammer out a compromise solution.
I assume that many in the anti-war movement sense this, and have been reduced to “just leave” as opposed to “stay the course” as the lesser of evils.
When it comes down to it, I fully agree that a strong plan for what leaving looks like would bolster the cause of the movement. I, like others, fear that executing such a plan isn’t within the realm of political possibility anytime before January 2009.
Josh, I’m afraid you may be right. I would only add two things:
1. Rhetorically, antiwar activists need to show they can not only criticize, but also lead. We need to show that we could run this country and its foreign policy effectively. Even if no change is possible before Bush leaves, we need to be able to envision that change.
2. Political activists, in my opinion, need to balance their demands for the ideal with a sense of pragmatism. We need to be pragmatic and recognize that it may not be possible to leave Iraq before January 2009. But we must not surrender completely and say that leaving Iraq in a month is impossible: the world needs a sane voice advocating speedy, controlled, and effective withdrawal ASAP. If that voice doesn’t exist, we will in some sense have given our approval to the administration. And keeping the momentum of the discussion about the war going has ramifications beyond just the war itself - hopefully, it prompts an examination into the root causes of the war, and how our government accumulated the power to do this in the first place. Hopefully, that discussion will last even beyond the war’s end.
I can across this post today and thought it demonstrated one of the ways in which we can use conversation with Iraqis to guide our foreign policy. Granted, the post isn’t very policy-rich, but it does describe a conversation with one Iraqi about life in Iraq and the nation’s future.
Not much, but I thought I’d pass it along.