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Getting Out, Pt. 2: Afghanistan |
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Yesterday the New York Times‘ piece on Afghanistan sparked a follow-up at the Informed Comment Global Affairs blog by Barnett Rubin, a well-known expert on Afghanistan. While Rubin mostly praises the Times‘ effort, he argues that they have missed at least two things: the limited accomplishments that came as a result of the UN’s presence in Afghanistan and how the Bush administration’s ideological blinders exacerbated the problems of nation-building following the invasion.
Rubin’s critiques are fair. One thing he himself neglects, however, is the necessity to refashion our image of the Taliban. Rubin and other experts on Afghanistan have often tended to over-emphasize the Taliban’s foreign connections (to Pakistan and the US especially) and downplay its appeal as a homegrown movement.
Yet while the Taliban certainly received major funding from outside powers in the 1990s, so did other hardline Islamic movements in Afghanistan. Why then did the Taliban succeed and grow when other such movements failed? The Taliban’s success rested on more than just financial backing - it turned on the Taliban’s ability to connect, both ideologically and in terms of bringing order and stability, with large segments of the Afghan people. They have, it seems, retained this connection in some areas up to the present day - the Taliban could not survive in Afghanistan without substantial local support.
Understanding this point will help us devise a strategy to truly defeat the Taliban. How can we defeat them? Essentially, by taking over the functions they fulfill for the people, and doing a better job at it. What do Afghans want? Well, my guess is they want order, stability, security. They want an end to civilian casualties. They want food, clothing, shelter, and working infrastructure. They want to be respected. They want an income. The US and/or NATO and/or the UN can do a better job at providing these things than the Taliban can - the problem is, in some areas we’re making ourselves more hated than loved, and we’re driving people back into the arms of the Taliban. And while we can keep hunting for Taliban troops, as long as we persist in misunderstanding the relationship between the Taliban and local populations we will be winning battles but not wars.
In short, those who advocate “nation-building” in Afghanistan are onto something. But nation-building needs to be done with some real sensitivity to local realities, and that means it should not be a strictly top-down process. We cannot afford to indulge in fantasies. Poppy eradication will do little good - we need to be offering solid economic alternatives to poppy farmers. The killing of civilians needs to stop. Put our soldiers to work building roads, bridges, power supply lines, factories. Pump some real money into the country and make sure it actually gets to the people, and see how many of them come over to our side. Listen to them and take their suggestions. Empower them. Because the Taliban won’t be gone until we’ve actually addressed the reasons why they exist.
Can the US win in Afghanistan? I think the question is phrased poorly. What we should be asking ourselves is, can the international community rebuild Afghanistan? And to that, I think the answer is yes.
I’d like to see more neighborly cooperation in the region too. Pakistan and Afghanistan share a lot of the same problems when it comes to the Taliban, and so they might be ready not only to team up to help themselves, but to come at the international community as a united front. A real stong alliance there I think would help bolster support (monetarily and politically) for a real rebuilding movement in Afghanistan. Aid isn’t something the U.S. likes to do these days, but it has worked before and it can possibly work again.
As far as Pakistan goes, I honestly don’t know that much about the country - I think it’s hard to, because in certain ways it’s a powder keg and no one knows what direction it’s going in. But another complication in that area of the world is that Afghanistan was maybe never meant to exist as a sovereign nation - in the 19th century, for example, it was just kind of a “buffer” between British and Russian spheres of influence. So as you correctly point out, a lot of Afghanistan’s problems are Pakistan’s problems too - and one reason for that is that many of the Pashtun tribespeople living on either side of the border don’t self-identify as particularly “Pakistani” or “Afghan” - their allegiances are primarily local, ethnic, religious, etc, rather than national. And the Taliban has been able to tap into those allegiances in certain cases.
I think recognition of these local alliances are a key issue. As you’ve stated, the Taliban wins converts because it provides the economic and social programs people need. The fact that they are Islamic Fundamentalist is almost besides the point (though I imagine it helps their cause a bit). They did eradicate poppy production because of that fundamentalism, and they did it with force instead of with alternatives. As a result, poppy production, though not Islam-friendly, has been in resurgence since they were driven out.
Getting these governments to engage the locals instead of being focused on rooting out terrorism (which has been our push as of yet) is the real challenge.