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A Progressive Iraq: The Center for American Progress - Strategic Reset |
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In June of 2007, The Center for American Progress released a report entitled “Strategic Reset: Reclaiming Control of U.S. Security in the Middle East” (pdf). When examined against the framework I’ve laid out for discussing a progressive solution to Iraq, the report immediately starts off well. Indeed, its title proclaims the need for a regional solution instead of myopically focusing on Iraq, one of the central tenants of a progressive solution.
By and large, Strategic Reset adheres to progressive viewpoints throughout, advocating for a quick phased withdrawal with all but 1,000 troops out of Iraq by the end of 2008, putting forward a robust and well thought out diplomatic initiative, and elucidating ideas and reasoning to deal with larger Arab issues. Below, I’ll examine how the plan adheres to my four stated assertions in an effort to understand which parts of this plan are worthy of progressive support and to build new ways for progressives to talk about a broader solution to Iraq.
Briefly, the four assertions are:
- The Iraq War was a mistake.
- Our presence in Iraq is making things worse, not better.
- Iraq is a political problem, and it requires a political solution.
- Our goal in Iraq should not be to “win,†but to leave responsibly.
In so many words, this CAP report admits the Iraq war was a mistake. In the introduction it states:
The current Iraq strategy is exactly what Al Qaeda wants—the United States distracted and pinned down by Iraq’s internal conflicts and trapped in a quagmire that has become the perfect rallying cry and recruitment tool for Al Qaeda. The United States has no good options given the strategic and tactical mistakes made on Iraq since 2002, but simply staying the course with an indefinite military presence is not advancing U.S. interests.
That statement, combined with some long sections detailing proposals for supporting Iraqi refugees (something Bush is unwilling to do because it implicitly admits mistakes), make it clear to me that Brian Katulis, Lawrence J. Korb, and Peter Juul, the authors of this report, understand that the Iraq war was not only badly handled but was misguided from the outset.
Strategic Reset is just as progressive when detailing plans for withdrawal. All effort is made to leave as quickly as possible, and at multiple points this report states that further presence by U.S. forces is hurting the situation in Iraq. Statements such as our presence in Iraq is “exactly what Al Qaeda wants,” “Bogged down by Iraq’s sectarian infighting, the United States and other countries have not been able to achieve progress on Iraq’s economic reconstruction,” and the like clearly show CAP understand the idea that the American presence is making the situation worse. They advocate for beginning the withdrawal “immediately” and make sure to remind readers that a continued U.S. troop presence not only de-incentivizes political reconciliation, but it makes Iraq’s neighbors less likely to compromise or come to the table.
Strategic Reset is also full of political solutions, though some of them strike me as a bit strange. One of the biggest proposals given is to stop unconditionally training the Iraqi Army and national police. The reasoning goes that because there has been no political reconciliation (and there is unlikely to be any for some time), national security forces such as the army or the police force are nothing but political pawns, hopelessly corrupt and loyal to tribal rather than national interests. This reasoning is sound. American soldiers have been known to fight against the very troops they have been training, and the army and the police force are feared by Sunnis as deadly tools of the Shiite majority. More importantly, Strategic Reset argues that strengthening these national forces directly arms one of the participants in the ongoing Iraqi civil war, thus making the conflict more vicious and longer lasting.
However, the CAP’s solution seems unlikely to offer anything much better. Instead of arming national security agencies, Strategic Reset suggests the U.S. focus on local forces that are accountable to local interests. I fail to see how this solution solves the basic problem of sectarian corruption. Training local forces would help strengthen security in homogeneous areas, but would increase violence in mixed neighborhoods. If national forces are hopelessly compromised by sectarian partisans, why would local forces be any different? The only advantage I see in arming local forces would be their numbers would necessarily be smaller and more fragmented, possibly making them less of a collective threat. Beyond that, there is no reason to believe they would be any less sectarian or any less deadly.
Strategic Reset’s international proposals are the best and most detailed I’ve read yet, fully taking into account the idea of international solutions and leaving responsibly. The plan advocates for a withdrawal of troops to neighboring countries, leaving some in Kurdistan to placate the Turks.
As the redeployment begins in 2007, U.S. forces would continue to rotate into the region to take up missions in Kuwait, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Forces currently deployed in Iraq will rotate home, while other units will come into the region to take up critical missions outside of Iraq, positioned to strike at global terrorist targets in Iraq and to enhance regional security. The post-redeployment U.S. force structure in the Middle East would include: an Army brigade and a tactical air squadron stationed in Kuwait; two light, mobile Army brigades stationed in the northern Kurdish areas; a Marine Expeditionary Unit afloat in the Gulf; and four to five Army combat brigades stationed in Afghanistan to complete the unaccomplished mission of eradicating Al Qaeda there.
This redeployment plan, to be completed by September 2008, strikes me as a responsible withdrawal. We withdraw to friendly countries which allows us to keep an eye on the situation, we refocus on actually making progress in Afghanistan, and we keep Turkey and Kurdistan happy with a small troop presence on relatively secure grounds.
The plan then calls for a decentralization of diplomatic strength, placing small embassies around the country in secure areas needing less protection rather than a mammoth embassy (costing over 144 million dollars) in the middle of Baghdad. In addition, under the plan the U.S. would work out a joint security deal with all of Iraq’s neighbors involving securing Iraq’s borders (with joint patrols), and providing economic and political assistance. The U.S. has ample leverage to accomplish these goals. None of Iraq’s neighbors want a failed state on their border and all are moving on their own to fill the power vacuum. As the Iraq Study Group suggested, the U.S. needs to coordinate these efforts to ensure everyone is working in the region’s best interest.
To bolster good will in the region and to work towards wider reconciliation, Strategic Reset recommends restarting the Israeli/Palestinian peace process, as well as involving Arab groups (the Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference, etc…) and the UN in regional security talks, economic assistance plans, formal counter-terrorism arrangements, and troop commitments. The report also recommends intense high-level bilateral talks with Iran and Syria, though it doesn’t get into what carrots might be offered to those countries in exchange for their cooperation.
As a point of good will as well as a moral stance, the report suggests the U.S. greatly expand access to visas for Iraqi refugees, something that can only help the situation both in Iraq and in the larger Arab world.
Clearly, Strategic Reset’s international solutions pass the progressive sniff test. The plan on the whole is not perfect, but by and large it is a progressive one. Certainly its reliance on training of local militias is cause for some skepticism. However, its international proposals are sound and should be implemented immediately. An international solution is the only way forward in Iraq now. For progressives who want to intelligently discuss future plans for Iraq, Strategic Reset is full of good ideas.
What are your thoughts, either on the report or my summary? Is Strategic Reset a progressive plan for Iraq?
Other articles on progressive plans for Iraq:
We Need A Progressive Plan For Iraq
A Progressive Iraq: Obama’s Plan
A Progressive Iraq: The Iraq Study Group Report
A Progressive Iraq: Looking Far Forward
Good rundown, J.
I would add one other principle–basically, something that says that the definition (or definitions) of the Iraqi state cannot be imposed by a foreign power. If the US (most likely) decides for Iraq what kind of government they will have or whether Iraq exists as one country or three, then we are making all the same mistakes that other colonial powers have made–in Iraq, in the region, and in the world.
I would agree with your point. Basically, the whole idea here is to try and stay out of Iraqi internal politics altogether. Either there will be reconciliation or there won’t. Either the country will stay together or it won’t. The U.S. doesn’t necessarily have to base its policy around these outcomes. Instead, by looking more broadly and internationally, we can be prepared for whatever happens.