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A Progressive Iraq: Joe Biden’s Soft Partition |
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Unlike a lot of Democratic candidates, Joe Biden has a plan for Iraq. That doesn’t necessarily make it a good plan, or a fleshed out one, but it is a plan. That’s important. As I’ve argued, progressives need to be thinking about the future of Iraq. We need to be able to answer the question of what happens after we leave Iraq.
While Joe Biden has much more of a concrete idea than many candidates in both parties, his plan largely fails to live up to the four assertions I’ve laid out to help people judge Iraq plans with respect to a progressive worldview. These assertions, briefly, are:
- The Iraq War was a mistake.
- Our presence in Iraq is making things worse, not better.
- Iraq is a political problem, and it requires a political solution.
- Our goal in Iraq should not be to “win,†but to leave responsibly.
Joe Biden’s plan, entitled Iraq: A Way Forward, essentially dodges most of these assertions, is fundamentally undetailed, and comes off more as a set of hopes than a plan that can be executed. The first strike against this plan is that it is short, only three pages long. While this makes for snappy reading but dissapointing breadth and depth of explanation.
There is little in the way of introduction to the Biden plan. The farthest Biden gets into current policy is to say:
President Bush does not have a strategy for victory in Iraq. His strategy is to prevent defeat and to hand the problem off to his successor. As a result, more and more Americans understandably want a rapid withdrawal, even at the risk of trading a dictator for chaos and a civil war that could become a regional war. Both are bad alternatives.
This is exactly right. A progressive plan for Iraq, one that adheres to the above four assertions, would both withdraw American troops quickly and prevent chaos from following our withdrawal. However, Biden immediately fails to address point one. He does not admit that the Iraq war was a mistake. While some would say this kind of thinking risks living in the past, I feel it is crucial to admit mistakes. By admitting our fundamental errors, we can reassure both the Iraqis, the Middle East, and the larger world that we are committed to peace not solely on our terms. By admitting our mistakes we take a great stride towards restoring our credibility.
At points, Biden seems to understand point two, and claims to understand that an immediate withdrawal is necessary. In fact, he calls for a mostly complete withdrawal by the summer of 2008. However, he says that some 20,000 troops would remain in Iraq “to strike any concentration of terrorists, help keep Iraq’s neighbors honest and train its security forces.”
This position does not seem to take into account the fact that this reduced force would simply be a target, a less protected, more exposed, easier to hit target. More importantly, it fails to look for larger solutions. As other plans such as The Center For American Progress’ Strategic Reset point out, a counter-terrorism and training force could be maintained in the region, not in Iraq itself, which would take our troops entirely out of the Iraqi civil war while maintaining the capabilities that are necessary in the short term to preserve security and continue training.
The Biden plan does, however, take into account the fact that a solution to Iraq will be largely political as called for in assertion two. The major points of this plan deal with internal Iraqi politics. Iraq would be federalized into 3 semi-autonomous regions. Iraq’s national government would take care of truly national interests such as defense, foreign policy, and oil. The rest would be left to the three states. Biden correctly points out that this kind of “soft partition” is actually in just about everyone’s interests, saying:
The Sunnis increasingly understand they will not regain power in Iraq. Faced with the choice of being a permanent minority player in a central government dominated by Shiites or having the freedom to control their day-to-day lives in a Sunni region, they are likely to choose the latter provided they are guaranteed a fair share of oil revenues to make their region viable. The Shiites know they can dominate Iraq politically, but not defeat a Sunni insurgency, which can bleed Iraq for years. The Kurds may dream of independence, but fear the reaction of Turkey and Iran - their interest is to achieve as much autonomy as possible while keeping Iraq together.
While this is all true, I’m not sure how it is to be accomplished. For example, Biden calls for the U.S. to “gain agreement” for a federal solution and to “empower the central government to set national oil policy.” How exactly is the U.S. supposed to do any of those things? Our credibility and leverage within Iraqi politics is extremely low. The Iraqi parliament has been working unsuccessfully on an oil sharing law for almost a year. How are we supposed to “empower the central government” and “gain agreement?” If the Iraqis decide that federalism is their solution, then by all means we should go with it. But if not, we have no power to force that change. At best, the heart of Biden’s plan is merely a hope that the Iraqis will act in everyone’s self-interest. From what we’ve seen of sectarian politics so far, this is hardly ever the case.
A real progressive plan for Iraq would try and take internal Iraqi politics out of the equation altogether while bringing the problem to the world stage where the U.S. still retains influence. Biden has a section dealing with international solutions as well, though (like most of the plan), it is short and lacking in specifics. Biden calls for “a major diplomatic offensive” and conferences with Iraq’s neighbors and the U.N. to discuss border security and to support Iraq’s federalism.
Unlike other plans, such as The Center For American Progress’ Strategic Reset or the Iraq Study Group, Biden hardly spells out exactly who would be invited and what leverage the U.S. might have over them to get things done. What is the U.S. willing to give in return for cooperation? What exactly are we looking for here? Troop commitments? Trade deals? The lack of specifics when dealing with the international community say to me that the heart of the Biden plan is in internal Iraqi politics, which as argued above, are completely unreliable.
Really, the only assertion that Biden takes to heart is number four. The entire thrust of this plan, as stated above, is to leave quickly and without chaos, making a responsible exit the ultimate goal. Winning is not mentioned. The problem is, Biden does not admit mistakes, calls for residual forces in Iraq, and promotes benchmarks that the U.S. is in no position to actually enforce. This plan, though interesting, is not a progressive plan. It gives the U.S. no actual way forward as it is not actionable. Any efforts to enforce federalism in Iraq (by gunpoint or otherwise) would quickly look as foolhardy as Bush’s idea that a “surge” of forces would help Iraqi politicians work together. While Iraqis may eventually decide to “stand up,” that’s not something the U.S. should or needs to count on.
I do, however, comend Biden for putting something on the table. As he himself says:
The question I have for those who reject this plan is simple: what is your alternative?
He is exactly right in asking that question. In studying these plans, I hope to learn about the ideas that have already been put forward so I can start discussing plans of my own.
Progressives, I put it to you. What do you think of Biden’s plan? What is your alternative?
Further Progressive Iraq reading:
We Need A Progressive Plan For Iraq
A Progressive Iraq: Obama’s Plan
A Progressive Iraq: The Iraq Study Group Report
A Progressive Iraq: Looking Far Forward
A Progressive Iraq: The Center For American Progress - Strategic Reset
@Alex,
J and I have gone back and forth a lot ourselves on this point. Obviously he’ll answer for himself, but the reasoning as I see it is that setting benchmarks for Iraqis has been counterproductive - we want to avoid the “when they stand up, we’ll stand down” mentality.
I think we’re all in agreement there. The point of what J is saying is to relieve them of that pressure - by taking the US out of the equation. I think a lot of people are agreed that the ideal scenario would involve the US withdrawing all military forces but helping to bring in a largely Muslim, largely Arab peacekeeping force. In this context, one hopes that the Iraqis could work out their problems themselves without our interference. But the priority is to get the US out because I think we’re hampering their political progress. Obviously there are other components that any solution will address, but a US military exit should be one of them.
I feel like I’m not expressing myself well, but I think we’re basically on the same page, just maybe not using the same language. Personally, I’m ready to recognize whoever and call on whomever is necessary to broker some peace. Maybe the issue here is when J says “a real progressive plan for Iraq” what he primarily means is “a real progressive plan for getting the United States out of Iraq.” Clearly the story won’t end there, but it’s a good start.
While you can’t ignore the will of the Iraqis, you have to work in larger circles. That means that yes, the U.S. should support positive forces in Iraq. But that can’t be the only strategy, or even, in my opinion, the major strategy.
At this point, Iraq’s future rests just as much with its neighbors as it does with internal affairs. Sectarian violence is fueled by external forces. Things won’t even get a chance to calm down unless we take that into account.
Basically, the idea is not to impose anything on Iraq (that would be callous, and doomed to failure), but not to rely on anything in Iraq either. I think there is a lot of progress to be made simply by looking internationally and dealing with Iraqis internal politics from a regional perspective.