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Interview with a Florida Elections Expert Part I (History, 2000-The Present) |
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As voters look ahead to next year’s elections, many of us are concerned that issues from recent elections - voter fraud, voter suppression, and problems with electronic voting machines - will again rear their ugly heads. What should we as voters understand about the recent past, and what is being done to ensure that Americans can vote securely for the coming elections?
Some interesting - and worrying - answers to these questions come from Dan McCrea, an elections expert from Florida who has been working for election reform since 2003. McCrea has testified at the federal, state, and local levels on election issues, and in 2007 co-founded the Florida Voters Coalition, the first state-wide election organization in Florida. This, the first part of my interview with McCrea, covers issues with elections in 2000, 2004, and 2006 in Florida and nationwide.
The 2000 elections occurred before McCrea began his work with election reform, but no election reform activist, particularly in Florida, can ignore the issues 2000 raised. McCrea has made a careful study of events in Florida and drawn important conclusions.
In 2000, he says, “the fact that our ‘right to vote’ is a state by state ‘right’ with little federal grounding became apparent.” Contrary to popular belief, he continues, “Americans have no direct constitutional right to vote.”
The 2000 elections showed how dysfunctional our decentralized voting process can be. “The train-wreck of multiple county systems and state political interests feuding and fighting, eventually having to be decided by an horrific Supreme Court decision demonstrated that in America, citizens’ right to vote, such as it is, varies across 50 sets of rules (the states) that are administered by over 3,000 US counties.”
For McCrea, Florida’s experience in the 2000 elections also demonstrated that election reform should be a bipartisan issue. “Democrats,” he told me, “behaved no better than Republicans in Florida. Gore’s legal team wanted four counties re-counted – not all sixty-seven. Democrats were no more interested in counting all the votes than Republicans.”
Legislation that came out of the Florida debacle, instead of boosting voters’ rights, actually made the situation worse. “The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), the landmark election reform bill passed by Congress in the aftermath of 2000, set in motion expensive, insecure, and unreliable voting systems and yet another form of a government-enabled business bonanza for private corporations. Worst of all, those private corporations have convinced lawmakers and the courts that they should own the election information and be allowed to keep it private – a dangerous insult to a democratic system of government.”
When the problems in Florida went unsolved after 2000, they were doomed to be repeated - in Ohio, which McCrea calls “the Florida of 2004.” Similarities between Ohio in 2004 and Florida in 2000 included the fact that “like Florida Secretary of State, and the state’s Chief Elections Officer, Katherine Harris, in 2000, Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell also served as the Bush Campaign’s state co-chair.”
McCrea believes that we must eliminate such potential conflicts of interest by requiring a “cooling off period” when officials move from the government to the private sector in elections work. “Until these and other glaring ethics gaps are closed,” he says, “elections will always be vulnerable to improper influence and corruption…Ethics laws remain either too weak or not properly enforced in most states today. Nothing stops the Harris/Blackwell condition from occurring again today in Florida (or Ohio I believe).”
Other similarities stand out as well, including reports of voter intimidation in urban, minority areas like Cleveland. Another form of voter suppression was the crippling confusion that surrounded many individual polling stations. “Numerous polling places were starved for working equipment or supplies, roles were corrupted or incomplete, precincts couldn’t open on time, groups of voters received calls the night before the election fraudulently telling them their polling place had been moved – all causing voters to be turned away in certain precincts. In the end, multiple officials were jailed or fired and some say Ohio, and therefore the Presidential election, was thrown or could have been thrown and we’ll never know.
“What we saw in Ohio, and the various issues involved, are far from over. They may yet make for historic revelation. It is unlikely, however, that revelation will come from finding or counting more votes…Any historic revelation coming from the elections of 2000 and 2004 will come from investigation of what people did – and even that will probably require someone that someone flips – someone talks.”
While Florida, and to a greater extent Ohio, remain electoral mysteries, election issues in Sarasota, Florida in 2006 seemed to offer election activists the best chance they had yet had of using the legal process to obtain greater transparency in elections.
Many of the issues raised in the court cases associated with the disputed 2006 election for the seat of Congressman Vern Buchanan (FL-13) were detailed in a previous Seminal article by Mac, “Sarasota Blues.” In brief, the legal process practically ground to a halt when a Florida judge ruled that the public could not have access to the voting machines company’s source code because it would violate the company’s right to its trade secrets. McCrea, who helped work on the case, provided us with an update.
After months of investigation prompted by the case which Democrat Christine Jennings (the other candidate for the disputed seat) filed with the US Congress, the General Accounting Office reviewed Florida’s audit of the Sarasota vote and released a report (.pdf) on October 2nd entitled “Further Testing Could Provide Increased but Not Absolute Assurance That Voting Systems Did Not Cause Undervotes in Florida’s 13th Congressional District.â€Â
Back in Florida, McCrea is dismayed by how events have progressed. The court cases, he said, have “slowed to a crawl.” Jennings and Buchanan will have a rematch in 2008, but larger issues remain unresolved - and unsettling:
“What is profoundly disturbing is that Sarasota’s undervote case represented the strongest case yet to compel the vendor to allow its proprietary hardware and software to be scrutinized in a failed election – and the court denied it. The court said that the vendor’s rights to protect its private proprietary property, protected by federal intellectual property law, trumped the public’s right to investigate a serious anomaly in a federal election to seat a member of Congress. It does not bode well for the future of democracy, the battle to contain corporate influence in government, and the public’s trust in any branch of the government to observe basic fairness and the transparency we all have assumed must be protected somewhere in American jurisprudence.”
With so many questions from our recent electoral past unsettled, looking optimistically at the question of voters’ rights for the next election seems difficult. However, McCrea - and like-minded activists all over the country - continue to fight for reform and transparency in our electoral process. Stay tuned for the next segment of the interview, in which McCrea discusses current activist efforts and what ordinary citizens can do to get involved.














Nothing’s sacred in the works of man.
Sadly, viewing proprietary software may not provide any answers at all. If, and that’s a very big IF voting machines were tampered with, any deviant code is long gone. Moreover testing the machines after the fact might not be productive unless all conditions match those encountered on Election Day, including internal system dates, quantities and individual ballot voting patterns.
As a voting public, we must demand more from our government and our election officials. We must treat the acquisition of voting machines more like a business. And we must fix our election laws to protect us from machine and human error, and human interpretation of election results. Until we do, our election process will continue to be broken. 2000, 2004 and Sarasota’s 2006 should have been automatic do-overs.
Lani Massey Brown, A MARGIN OF ERROR: BALLOTS OF STRAW, currently featured on VotersUnite.Org. In BALLOTS OF STRAW when Florida’s governor infiltrates America’s voting machines, only one woman can stop him – one woman and the man sent to spy on her.
I gotta say, there must be a way to do electronic voting, or even online voting. I mean, yes, the system we have now is totally flawed. Private companies, shady dealings, proprietary code. All bullshit for public elections.
But come on, we’re a nation of smart people. We can figure this thing out. I’m looking forward to part II, hopefully there are some clues in there.
J-Ro: You may want to check out Punchscan (http://punchscan.org/), Scantegrity (http://scantegrity.org/), or any of the other newer “E2E” or “Open-Audit” voting systems that academics are proposing:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems
That said, this article does a great job explaining that it is not just the technology that is flawed in existing elections.
I’m sorry, but I just have to say… This complex and detailed code in computerized voting, with all the potential for flaws and errors:
thisVote = thisVote + 1;
// or even better:
thisVote++;
You see what I’m saying? Any “errors” made in this code are intentional. Just so that everyone knows and we’re all clear. Sure, there’s a GUI and a redundant data storage/retrieval system built on top of this simple counter/tally, but if you can mess up something this basic, knowing that the ENTIRE NATION is depending on your abilities, and not realize it until after release… well, wow!
These are men I don’t want walking the streets without a guardian holding their hand; let alone would I give them any authority over the electoral process.
Roy,
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. The touch screen and optical scan sensors are not always accurate (at least, not in the way vendors have developed them). Fundamentally, the problem is with how secure the devices really are — can you be sure it is not running some sort of malicious software? How secure is the record that each machine produces?
Answers to these questions are not very encouraging, and the vendors have failed on exceptional levels. They could have done much, much better. However, E2E manages to avoid many of these problems because it gives you an ATM-like privacy preserving (encrypted) receipt, and all the receipts are posted to an official record. Much like money, you can check the record and make sure your receipt is present and unaltered. Using public algorithms you can make sure that the receipts were formed correctly, and that a group of receipts correspond to a specific tally. Breaking the encryption (nearly impossible to do) only tells you what was on each receipt, but doesn’t let the final count change. On the machine based E2E systems mandatory, overwhelming auditing procedures are used to make sure the machines are correctly producing receipts, and you the voter can audit the machines as many times as you want. Something similar is achieved on the paper-based systems.
I encourage you to check out these solutions.