A Progressive Iraq: The Brookings Institute - Soft Partition

Partition seems to be the buzzword when talking Iraq policy in certain think tank circles. The recent Congressional hearings on Iraq brimmed with notions of federalism and decentralization, and Joe Biden’s plan for Iraq (examined here last week), hinges on a partition of some kind to “solve” our problems and end our war.

I remain deeply skeptical that partition is the right solution for Iraq, mostly because I can see no way for the U.S. to actually accomplish that goal. I believe the U.S. has lost all credibility and influence over internal Iraqi politics. Because of our mistakes, we have lost the ability to bargain in good faith. As such, while partition may be the eventual Iraq solution, the U.S. has no power to move the Iraqis towards it. If it happens, then we may well support it. But if it doesn’t, we’ll need some other plan. Relying on a partition of Iraq as a solution therefore seems like a prescription for inaction assuming the Iraqis decide not to move towards partition. That is unacceptable, as the situation in Iraq must change and must change quickly.

The Brookings Institute lays out the case for partition and how it could be implemented in their policy paper entitled Soft Partition (pdf). Is this plan a progressive one? A truly progressive plan for Iraq would take into account the following four assertions:

1. The Iraq War was a mistake.
2. Our presence in Iraq is making things worse, not better.
3. Iraq is a political problem, and it requires a political solution.
4. Our goal in Iraq should not be to “win,” but to leave responsibly.

By reading the proposal through the lens provided above, Soft Partition fails conclusively. This is not a plan progressives could support, mostly because it calls for a heightened troop presence for an unacceptable amount of time and it fails to offer ways to actually implement partition or more importantly, remove the U.S. from internal Iraqi politics altogether.

While Soft Partition doesn’t expressly admit the U.S. made a mistake by invading Iraq (which I believe is crucial to restoring our credibility with Arabs and the world), Edward P. Joseph and Michael E. O’Hanlon, the authors of the report, do admit the situation is Iraq is bad and getting worse. While talking about the historical reactions to partition, they begin the report by saying:

Iraqi realities are beginning to trump theory. Ethnic killing and cleansing are the most important evidence of this trend. The proof goes further than acts of violence alone. The views and actions of an even larger percentage of the population than the violent minority (or “extremists” as Iraqi officials label them) indicate a drift towards separation.

This is the progressive viewpoint on Iraq as I understand it. We are in the middle of a civil war between two sides who care about sectarian viewpoints over a unified, sovereign nationality. They are sectarian first and Iraqi second. This view and others make it clear that Soft Partition understands that the current situation in Iraq is untenable and must change. We are indeed making things worse by preserving the status-quo, something Joseph and O’Hanlon continually refer to as unacceptable.

Soft Partition also realizes that the Iraq situation requires a political solution as opposed to a military one. This, too, is consistent with a progressive worldview. However, Soft Partition’s political solution is partition.

The reasons why partition might be an answer to Iraq are given quite clearly, and for the most part these reasons are sound. Joseph and O’Hanlon argue that Iraq is already partitioning, that Iraqis equate safety with homogeneous groups, that is in the best interests of all sects to partition at least somewhat, and that partition can indeed reduce the violence and turmoil in Iraq. However, to accomplish a partition, Joseph and O’Hanlon require significant cooperation from all major parties in Iraq. They say:

The key is to have the parties in Iraq accept the relocation policy at least informally—again, with the caveat that it will be essential to strike an agreement on the over-arching issues of oil production and revenue- sharing. With an informal understanding among the belligerents, ethnic relocation can be less traumatic and destabilizing.

What’s lacking, of course, is any strategy to gain that agreement. So far, the U.S. has almost played sects against each other by supporting the Shi’a government in Baghdad yet working with Sunni tribal leaders and Kurds in other areas. Because of this and other failures, the U.S. currently lacks the capability to force agreements between the sects. We simply have no political leverage, and because each sect does not want to compromise and there is nothing driving them to back down, nothing gets done.

The Iraq oil law is a perfect example, as it is one of the most sought after agreements by the Bush administration, yet has floundered in discussions for almost a year without any significant progress. Soft Partition relies on the sects “standing up” and working together, so that the U.S. can stand down. As Bush’s strategy has shown, the Iraqis are unwilling or unable to stand up. Therefore, we cannot rely on them to provide our troops a way out of the conflict. Instead, we need to look outside of Iraqi politics towards the international stage where we still have leverage to make things happen. Soft Partition essentially ignores international solutions except to quickly disparage them, saying:

A regional peace process could help if regional states truly want peace. However, Iran in particular may be more intent on dealing the United States and its partners a decisive defeat, which is best accomplished by sustaining the violence within Iraq.

First, I don’t believe we have completely lost all leverage over Iran. In exchange for a reduction in tensions, an acceptance of a peaceful nuclear power program, and trade deals or alliances, I think the Iranians would step back from meddling in Iraq. Second, Iran is not the only power in the region and there are others that want a stable Iraq and are willing to work towards that goal. By ignoring international solutions, Soft Partition leaves us basically where we are now, with a hope for an unrealistic political solution (partition) and no way to actually get that solution implemented.

The plan gets worse when addressing the question of troop numbers and withdrawal timelines. In a twisted effort to “leave responsibly,” Soft Partition intuits that large numbers of troops will be needed to facilitate large population movements. They call for no troop reductions or even a troop increase for the first 12-18 months of partition, and after that a force of 50,000 troops to patrol partition borders and keep the peace for several years afterwards.

This withdrawal plan fails to take into account the fact that our soldiers in Iraq are targets in and of themselves. Violent Iraqis not only attack each other, but our military as well. Any troops in Iraq are fair game for more bloodshed, and as forces reduce to 50,000 or below, these troops will be even more overstretched and exposed. The bottom line is, Soft Partition will do little to ease the loss of American life in Iraq and ensures the U.S. involvement for at least 4-5 years to come. This is an unacceptable solution for progressives.

Clearly, Soft Partition is not a progressive plan, failing to fully encompass even one progressive assertion and completely ignoring the need for an immediate withdrawal and an international solution. Moreover, the partitioning of Iraq comes off as clearly colonial in nature. The Brookings Institute not only holds up the partition of Bosnia as a model to be replicated (even though that solution ended with upwards of 100,000 deaths and 1 million refugees), but is bold enough to propose drawing Iraqi borders (under the guise of UN stewardship in conjunction with Iraqi sects). Without a plan to actually win the major concessions this plan would need to take off, Soft Partition comes off to me as a neo-colonial pipe dream, a useless thought experiment borne of another era.

Instead of accepting plans like this one, progressives need to start articulating our own views for the future of Iraq. Certainly if the Iraqis decide for themselves that partition is the solution they want, the U.S. would do well to support that decision. However, we cannot rely on this ever happening and as such, progressives will need to look more broadly for their solutions. Does partition make sense to you? If not, what other ideas would you put forward for a U.S. exit from Iraq?

Further Progressive Iraq reading:

We Need A Progressive Plan For Iraq
A Progressive Iraq: Obama’s Plan
A Progressive Iraq: The Iraq Study Group Report
A Progressive Iraq: Looking Far Forward
A Progressive Iraq: The Center For American Progress - Strategic Reset
A Progressive Iraq: Joe Biden’s Soft Partition

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