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Pakistan in Crisis: History repeating? |
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Over the weekend, The New York Times published an article on the relationship between U.S. President Bush and Pakistan’s General Musharraf (“Bush Failed to See Musharraf’s Faults”, Nov. 18, 2007). According to the article, George Bush considers Pervez Musharraf not only an ally in the “war on terror” but also “a friend.” As a result, critics contend, Bush has often failed to see Musharraf’s short-comings. Colloquially termed the “Bush-Mush relationship”, there is no doubt that Bush’s personal affinity for the military leader/dictator has continually clouded his foreign policy judgment.
However, Bush is not the first president who has felt a “special” relationship with the president of Pakistan. In 1971, Henry Kissinger (then National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State) made similar comments about President Nixon’s relationship with Pakistan’s President Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. As summarized in a conversation memorandum (.pdf) from the National Security Archives,
“In all honesty, Dr. Kissinger pointed out, the President has a special feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life.â€Â
Facing a crisis in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)–considered a genocide or selective genocide by some (including U.S. military personnel in the area [.pdf])–Nixon and his foreign policy team were hesitant to do anything that might alienate West Pakistan, with whom the U.S. had strong ties. However, a strong argument can be made that close ties with Pakistan’s president clouded U.S. foreign policy judgment in this instance as well.
Although The New York Times reports that Bush is now distancing himself from Pervez Musharraf, and that the relationship was one of convenience rather than true friendship, the similarities between these close ties with foreign leaders and bungled foreign policies seems striking (and too similar for me to pass up, I had to share!).
What do you think, Seminal Readers, is there a lesson to be learned from history? Is there room for personal relationships in foreign policy? Do close ties (with political leaders) help or hurt U.S. Foreign Policy? Should the Bush-Mush relationship be saved or slaughtered? How should we respond to emergency rule and international crises (when we aren’t invited to interfere)?
Thoughts, comments, opinions, and insights are welcome below.
Hmm…I can’t say I’m against the whole idea of people being friends, or even world leaders. I think a good leader would tell a friend when they fucked up, and would cut them off it need be. Really, in my mind this has more to do with Bush. When you’ve got someone who values loyalty over talent, it’s no surprise that he’s loyal back when he shouldn’t be.
Bush allowed Musharraf’s actions not because he is loyal, not because they are friends, but because it is convenient to have Musharraf in control. this is world politics, not high school.
In Musharraf he has an ally, not a friend. The distinction is clear and important. With Musharraf in office, a ruler who is immune to poplar opinion, cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan continues regardless of the opinion of the people. In a country with a population of radical Muslims, neighbor to Afghanistan, this is invaluable to Bush. Can you imagine Bush doing anything but embracing him as an ally, regardless of his character?
So, Musharraf, who came to power through a coup and still wears his military uniform in office, has become close friends with our leader? the New York Times wants me to believe that, if not for the bond of friendship, our leader would’ve been compelled to speak out against repression?
Not very convincing.
LGS, I question the distinction you’re making because it seems to me the U.S. continues to back Musharraf despite his ineffectiveness in the ‘war on terror’, so his convenience as an ally is no longer a reason to support him (militarily, financially, etc.). With the Musharraf-Bush relationship, Musharraf as a person definitely took precedence over Musharraf’s ability to contribute to fight terrorism, and there are numerous instances one could cite in which Musharraf has not been effective in the war on terror. (Take for example, the decision to release 28 known insurgents with ties to extremist organizations following the imposition of emergency rule.)
IMHO, I think Musharraf has little remaining value as an ally, and the U.S.–if it’s going to continue to meddle in Pakistan’s internal politics–should stop supporting an ineffective (for our purposes) dictator and start considering other options. I can’t argue that if Bush didn’t have close ties to Musharraf U.S. foreign policy decision-making would’ve been different, but I do think Bush’s faith in the man in the uniform has continued far too long.