Pakistan :: Musharraf Steps Down :: Is a celebration in order?

After months of urging from opposition party leaders and U.S. officials, President Pervez Musharraf has finally removed the military uniform, ceremoniously passing the baton to his U.S.-educated successor, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.

Last week, the Supreme Court, stacked with judges loyal to Musharraf, dismissed the final legal case challenging the legitimacy of Musharraf’s re-election and cleared the way for him to resign his army position to become the newly elected civilian president. Musharraf is slated to be sworn in as president on December first.

In many respects, today should mark a great victory for those pushing for Pakistan’s return to democratic rule. However, the path by Musharraf restored the civilian presidency to Pakistan taints this accomplishment. Emergency rule was declared, the constitution altered, the Supreme Court deposed and reinstated with pro-Musharraf justices. The media were banned, lawyers and politicians arrested and the people deprived of their civil liberties. If this is what it takes to restore democracy to Pakistan, does the end result really outweigh the means by which it was achieved?

The world has been waiting for Musharraf to step down from his position as army general, but now that he has, little victory for democracy seems to remain. Is celebration in order because Musharraf has finally done what he should’ve done months ago? Or would celebration simply reward Musharraf for fighting dirty and breaking the law to get what he wanted? Musharraf’s resignation offers a mixed bag, if you ask me, and I’ll tell you why, after the jump.

Has emergency rule tainted Musharraf’s presidency?
(A leading question, I admit, but important nonetheless.) Musharraf’s long-standing relationship with the army and recent decision to impose emergency rule has become increasingly problematic for U.S. foreign policy, which has seen Musharraf as a key ally in the “war on terror” since shortly after 9/11. Now that Musharraf has stepped down from his position at the head of the army, the U.S. may resume its pro-Musharraf mumbo jumbo but only when emergency rule is lifted and general elections are held as scheduled. According to the BBC, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sees stepping down as a good first step, but re-emphasized the U.S.’s position that emergency rule must be lifted before elections are held.

Under emergency rule, Musharraf has been able to secure another term as president without risking many losses. After declaring the emergency, Musharraf proceeded to arrest opposition party members, oust Supreme Court justices and place them under house arrest and prevent a number of protests led by People’s Party leader Benazir Bhutto by filling the streets with armed riot police and placing Bhutto under house arrest. In effect, emergency rule, predicated on the argument that the growing threat of terrorist activity and Islamist insurgents made it necessary, allowed Musharraf to overcome all of the legal and political hurdles he had to face before securing the presidency.

Following re-election in parliament in October, numerous cases were brought against Musharraf challenging the legitimacy and constitutionality of his election while wearing the army uniform. Musharraf overcame these obstacles by stacking the Supreme Court with loyal chief justices who ruled in his favor and dismissed the cases challenging his legitimacy. To avoid a power-sharing deal with Benazir Bhutto orchestrated by the U.S., Musharraf placed Bhutto under house arrest, effectively quelling her attempts to oppose Musharraf’s rule with mass protests and demonstrations. Other protests were omitted from the Western news media by bans on the media and by placing journalists under arrest. In other ways as well, Musharraf prevented, curtailed and denied any and all opposition to his presidency.

He resisted surrendering his military power before all of the pieces were in place and once the last remaining obstacles were overcome, he resigned from the military with great pomp and circumstance.

What does stepping down mean for Musharraf?
In the past, Pakistan’s military has frequently deposed and overthrown its civilian leaders. The military coup that overthrew Nawaz Sharif’s civilian government was led by army general Musharraf in 1999, and he has remained at the top of the government and the military since he assumed his double title shortly after the coup. As a civilian leader, Musharraf will have to foster a new type of relationship with the army, one that will, I hope, enable the two organizations to work together rather than against one another. As The New York Times suggests, without commanding the military, Musharraf’s power as national leader declines drastically.

Mr. Musharraf had come under growing pressure internationally and from his own disenchanted public to relinquish his military post, and his grip on political power will be significantly loosened without the uniform. While the military remains loyal to him, General Kayani is understood to want to remove the army from the forefront of politics and concentrate on military concerns.

As long as the military remains loyal to Musharraf, as the article suggests, Musharraf has little reason to worry about the security of his position. Recognizing the skill with which Musharraf handled the potential challenges to securing his presidential position–deftly navigating the needs of U.S. foreign policy, opposition leaders, and public demands without ever putting his own power in jeopardy–I don’t imagine Musharraf will have any trouble making the transition from army commander to political negotiator. He already seems to possess the skills one needs to make amenable deals amidst growing opposition. However, Musharraf will have other obstacles to overcome as president, which may prove the biggest obstacles he’s faced today.

Without the power of the military at his fingertips (though he will likely continue to maintain a close relationship with the military), Musharraf will have to concentrate on improving the status quo for the people of Pakistan. As head of the army, leading the “war on terror” in Pakistan was at the top of General Musharraf’s to do list. As president, Musharraf will have to answer to the people; he will have to hear and respond to their complaints, their demands and their needs. Needs like education, health care and infrastructure will no longer take a backseat to the trumped up “war on terror”, and making tangible progress for the people in Pakistan will likely become the toughest challenge Musharraf has yet to face. Thus, it has now become the duty of every person in Pakistan to hold Musharraf accountable for fixing Pakistan and getting it back on track. Musharraf can no longer fumble around with power sharing deals and Supreme Court cases; he must focus on leading the people and the nation productively.

What does civilian leadership mean for the U.S. relationship with Pakistan?
More than once Musharraf has been heralded by Bush administration as a key U.S. ally in the “war on terror”, but several analysts have questioned Musharraf’s actual ability to aid the U.S. and its efforts to curb terrorism. Others have criticized Bush for being blinded to Musharraf’s faults by his special relationship with the military leader. Following the imposition of emergency rule, which Musharraf justified using arguments from the U.S. “war on terror”, Musharraf arrested hundreds of lawyers and political opponents and released dozens of known militant Islamists. Identifying several of those released by name and Taliban rank Newsweek points out,

Pakistani lawyers, human-rights activists and opposition-party members can scarcely ignore the irony of their situation: while thousands of them are being beaten and locked up under President Pervez Musharraf’s newly declared state of emergency, his government has just let more than two dozen militant Islamists out of jail. Protesters might be even angrier if Musharraf disclosed the names of some of those freed militants.

Nevertheless, Musharraf remained at the top of the list of U.S. allies in the “war on terror”.

Unfortunately, this incident is but one among many. In numerous instances, Musharraf has tread the path of least resistance, making marginal (if that) gains in the “war on terror” while manipulating the treat of “terrorism” in order to secure his position as U.S. ally and army commander. I am hopeful that once the offices of army commander and president are separated, the U.S. will see greater results from the aid offered to Pakistan. Instead of offering the country blank checks to be spent in whichever way Musharraf saw fit, I suspect that receiving U.S. aid will become competitive in Pakistan, in the sense that greater demands for aid both within and without the army will emerge. The U.S. will have to become more diligent in its aid distribution, making sure particular funds are directed toward the “war on terror” while other funds are directed toward civilian needs.

In some ways, civilian leadership will make giving aid to Pakistan easier; in other ways, it will become more complex. Because the U.S. “war on terror” often conflates fighting terrorism with preserving and promoting democracy, once civilian leadership is restored in Pakistan and the guise of democracy established, the U.S. will have a much easier time justifying the quantity and form of aid it gives Pakistan. In other respects, offering aid will become more complicated since two powerful bodies–the government and the military–which used to be one (or at least functioned under one leader) will both place demands on the U.S. for aid.

Certainly, civilian leadership will complicate the U.S. relationship with Pakistan if Pakistan continues to be considered only in its capacity as an ally in the “war on terror”. If the U.S. wishes to make progress in its so-called war, it will not only have to change the way in which it gives aid to its allies but also the way in which it wages ideological warfare. Winning the “war on terror” will require the U.S. to win the hearts and minds of future insurgents. Perhaps this is a lesson Musharraf and the U.S. will learn together.

Hey, Seminal Readers! What’s your take on Musharraf’s resignation? Got any hunches for how events will pan out in the next few months? Want to weigh in on the role of the U.S.’s special relationship with Musharraf? Thoughts, comments, questions, criticisms are welcome below.

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