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The US Spreads More Chaos: Africa's Afghanistan, Somalia |
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Yesterday Secretary Rice, speaking in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, called for more peacekeeping forces to bail out the Ethiopian troops in neighboring Somalia. Ms. Rice, however, has learned little from recent history:
Ethiopian troops marched into Somalia a year ago to help Somalia's UN-backed interim government oust Islamist forces. The US supported the intervention which has proven unpopular, with insurgents continuing to stage attacks. The UN says that one million Somalis have been displaced by the fighting, including 60% of the capital's residents.
The war in Somalia is not some obscure "African tribal conflict" - it is a direct result of international political maneuvering, just like Afghanistan. The similarities between the two countries, in fact, are striking. Both fell apart during the Cold War endgame. Afghanistan, invaded by the Soviets in 1979, has seen near-continuous warfare ever since, with some participants funded by the US. Somalia, after switching its allegiance from one superpower to another in the 80s, found itself abandoned by both in the early 90s. A coup brought down the president in 1991, and the chaos that began then has lasted until now.
In conditions of chaos and instability, Somalia and Afghanistan have both provided havens for terrorists at times (surprise surprise). They also both have powerful neighbors who meddle in their affairs (Ethiopia and Pakistan, respectively) and just happen to be US allies.
The Taliban came to power in Afghanistan partly because they could provide security when nobody else could. Similarly, a group called the Union of Islamic Courts came to power in Somalia in mid-2006 when they captured the capital, Mogadishu. Their power, like the Taliban's, rested on their capacity to make people's lives safer.
When Ethiopia invaded Somalia, the Islamists were quickly displaced - just like the Taliban. That's the easy part. But in Somalia like in Afghanistan, the Bush administration and its allies have failed to establish security for ordinary Somalis. The situation in Mogadishu is so dire that 60% of its former inhabitants have fled. So guess what? When the conditions that originally gave rise to a group like the Taliban or the Islamic Courts continue, these groups hang on. That's why the Taliban, according to a report released by the think tank Senlis (.pdf), may control as much as 54% of Afghanistan.
Too bad the only response the Bush administration (and think tanks like Senlis) can come up with is to step up military operations. Senlis even recommends extending NATO's troop presence into Pakistan - as though Pakistan needs any more instability right now. But America is going to have look more deeply into the root causes of the problems in Afghanistan and Somali if it wants to solve them.
What the International Crisis Group said about Somalia's Islamists in late 2005 provides a clue toward the appropriate response. The ICG suggests that we drop our rhetoric about fighting "Islamic extremism," stop fighting ordinary Somali people, and instead concentrate on building real partnerships with them:
Islamist extremism has failed to take a broader hold in Somalia because of Somali resistance – not foreign counter-terrorism efforts. The vast majority of Somalis desire a government – democratic, broadly-based and responsive – that reflects the Islamic faith as they have practised it for centuries: with tolerance, moderation and respect for variation in religious observance. Ultimately, there is no better way to confront jihadism than to assist Somalis in realising such a government.
Building up more troops is not a real answer for these problems. A greater militarization of the conflict in Somalia could destabilize Ethiopia - not unlike what has happened in Pakistan as a result of the War on Terror. Groups like the Taliban and the UIC originally came to power partly as a result of US policies in South Asia and East Africa - so let's change our policies now, before history repeats itself yet again.
Thank you Alex for the great article that you articulated the crisis on Horn of Africa with the ease and simplicity that is so much at precision to the root of the problems. I really admire the way you juxtoposed Somalia and Afghanistan, an unique perspective with a remarkable analysis.
Again, thank you, indeed.
Ibrahim Abdulkadir
I agree with Ibrahim. Very crisp and concise analysis. And on point as far as my own understanding of the situation goes. The key here really seems to be the establishment of some type of order, the provision of protection in an environment that is marked by the predatory practices of rival factions. In such situations, groups that have the capacity to establish some kind of monopoly over the use of force, regardless of their ideological dispositions or purported state-building interests, seem to have a clear advantage. Effective policies that seek to undermine the dominance of such groups need to address the root causes of their power with a degree of finesse that is largely absent from current foreign policy making. One consideration that is possibly worth noting because of its policy implications is that the support of local reformative regimes (i.e. regimes that offer increased public goods to their populations and are thus ideally worth supporting) may actually lead to an augmentation in the violent behavior of insurgent groups as these see themselves threatened in their survival. How to formulate policies that would effectively counter groups such as the Taliban or the UIC is up in the air. Beats me. What is clear is that policies that do not address or at least take into account root causes have very slim chances of long-term effectiveness and that an understanding of the processes to be confronted is a precondition for any kind of policy-making. Sorry for the rant, but I consider the issue that Alex has so competently addressed above one of the most complex and salient of (current) international affairs…
Casper, you seem a very knowledgable person who is versed in the Horn of Africa issues. But I would like to clear out one thing for you, in terms of the popularity that the UIC had enjoyed. The UIC was not actually a creation of some sort of movement that is has sprung up without any reasons. This movement was the result of the terror and constant aggressions that the Somali people had put up over the decade and half period of anarchy. The Somali people organized themselves as communities to tackle the thread of the warlords who were supported by Addis Ababa Administration that has always a vested interest in the prolongment of the Somali crisis. The Somali people needed one thing, and that was a leadership that is just and effective. And in fact, the UIC were not only just but they were very superior in terms of quality and services over any system that has existed in Somalia. In a short period of time, less then six months, the UIC movement had become so intertwined and reflective with the needs and interest of the Somali people in general. That by itself was indeed a threat to the Ethiopian dictator, because he knew a united Somalia would always be a source of protection for the occupied Somalis in Ogaden region in Ethiopia.
But the grave mistake was when the U.S. policy followed the Ethiopian vision of trying to isolate the Courts as something that has nothing to do with the Somalis and thus occupying the country against the international law and transgarresing its sovereignity. The other thing that is very crucial was the fact that Islamic Courts were not Al-qaida or had anything to do with. The western media was presenting them as something that is similar to the Taliban government without ever anaylizing or giving the Courts the benefit of the doubt. Also, it was evident that the whole affair between Ethiopia and U.S. were arranged in a manner that is based on short term goals, to make it done quickly and fix things in light of their views. But reality bites somethings, and the fact of the occupation is slowing to this painful failure was not only so predicatable to many Somalis but it is an awakening for the Ethiopia's internal political reality that is speeding up to a calamity, thus causing the U.S. to gear up to another quick fix mission for a perpetual process in many fronts without any successful results.
I think the U.S. policy-makers are learning things from the hard way, which is costing too much of credibility and integrity in the process. Let's hope Miss Rice does right this time around without resorting to Ethiopia's views towards Somalia.
Very useful dialogue. I wish the web had more such interaction.
Conflict in the Horn of Africa has become complicated by a global struggle between Islam and the West. Both Islamic extremists and some extremist Western politicians, eager to provoke a titanic conflict that each side believes it can win, are increasingly pushing the people of the Horn into extreme positions, undercutting the moderate middle, in order to fight a proxy war at the expense of the populations of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. As in the Cold War, local people are being forced to choose sides in a fight that is really not their fight. The battle in the Horn of Africa, as it was in the Cold War, is primarily about justice, security, and governance, but the world will not leave the Horn alone%u2026in part, for sure, because in any disrupted society, volunteers can always be found to help bring the world%u2019s battles into the local backyard.
As the political arena is polarized by the efforts of outside forces to win through military means and social problems are aggravated by the resultant chaos, individuals who might have become reformers become radicalized. As war eliminates the option of moderate reform, reformers turn into radicals and join sides with extremist outside forces, which, if nothing else, can at least offer money and weapons.
It remains far less clear, however, that the Islamic groups, such as the Islamic Courts Union, would participate in an international military jihad against the U.S. if given the option of managing their own society with help but without interference. The U.S. needs to examine conflict in Islamic societies with much finer resolution%u2026to distinguish between Islamic extremists bent on violence against civilians and Islamic activists whose goal is domestic reform. These two groups agree that their societies have problems–at least in part created by contact with the West–that need to be resolved, but they do not necessarily agree on the methods or the end goal. Lumping these groups together not only creates a much more powerful opponent, it leaves the local population with little choice but to support the extremists.
Unfortunately, this perspective seems very difficult to get across to Americans. One contribution that might help would be detailed stories of individuals to illustrate how a Somali (or Afghan or Iraqi or Lebanese or Palestinian) citizen reacts when forced to deal with these problems. If anyone has such accounts, I'd very much appreciate being given access to them.
Thank you, William Deb. Mills, for your great insights. I have also seen your blog and that extent of your understanding in the issues of the Horn of Africa. In regard to the personal stories that you suggested could help forge an understanding by the U.S. in reaction and the consequences of its policies, there are numerous stories, among which, I recently wrote about a story, titled The horrific Tale of Sonkorey. It's really a reality that the U.S. policy has chosen to ignore as the consequence of the current U.S. policy proves so devastating and inhumane.
I really think U.S. should change its genocidal policies towards the innocent people in Somalia. Safegaurding the U.S. interest by all means, even at the expense of 1.5 million Somali people is not only counterproductive, but it also undermines the future interest of the U.S. in other parts of the world. Supporting the criminal warlords of Somalia and advocating for a decent democratic system and the protection of the human rights are indeed at great contrast that portrays the weaknesses of the U.S. policy as well as the absence of any moral value in it.