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Confronting the Taliban: Political vs. Military Strategies |
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Is the course of the war in Afghanistan changing?
The British, still deeply embedded in the war in the Afghanistan, have begun to emphasize political progress as well as military strategy. This is partly reflected, the BBC writes, in changing language: instead of “defeating” the Taliban, British military officials now talk about “dismantling” the group.
Politically, the effort will be spearheaded by a more systematic effort to divide the Taleban. “We are not talking to the Taleban, we are splitting the Taleban,” said the British official. Whatever talking is done will be left to the Afghans.
The concept is that there are three tiers in the Taleban. The top tier is made up of the irreconcilable leadership. The second tier consists of locally based commanders and the bottom tier are the ordinary foot soldiers.
It is the second tier that is being targeted and the hope is that middle level commanders will bring a lot of the third tier with them. Some 5,000 ex-Taleban fighters are said to have come over before.
There are conditions. Defectors will have to renounce violence and accept the constitution.
The British are pushing for a sizeable increase in the Afghan army and the appointment of a special senior-level UN envoy to Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, American officials continue to couch their rhetoric in primarily military terms. Secretary Gates continues to push for greater NATO involvement. The US and the UK also differ on the issue of poppy cultivation, America favoring air campaigns to destroy crops and the UK arguing for cooperation with Afghan authorities to tackle the problem.
If western powers are going to “leave the talking to the Afghans,” however, they need to at least make sure that they are creating the conditions for national dialogue and reconciliation. The shift in terminology from “defeating” to “dismantling” may be a baby step in this direction, but the new rhetoric should be accompanied by real changes in policy. Taliban footsoldiers, and the peasants who support them, must be given real incentives to switch support away from the Taliban. Western military forces, in partnership with the Afghan government, shouldn’t just “win” battles - but make sure that battles stay won by sticking around to create conditions of security and economic stability for ordinary people.
The problem is, the longer western forces fumble their strategy in Afghanistan (and work at cross-purposes, even), the more they risk finding themselves stuck in Afghanistan while the situation completely unravels next door in Pakistan. A poll released today shows that a staggering 67% of Pakistanis want Musharraf to resign immediately.
An American-backed proposal that Musharraf form a government with Bhutto also appears to be deeply unpopular. Sixty percent of Pakistanis polled opposed such a deal, which American officials had hoped would bolster support for Musharraf.
Instead, 58 percent said they would support a “Grand Opposition Alliance” among Bhutto, Sharif and other parties against Musharraf, a former general who seized power in a 1999 coup. Fifty-six percent said the army, which has intermittently ruled Pakistan since it won independence from Britain 60 years ago, should have no role in civilian government.
If Bhutto and Sharif do not form an alliance, the country appears to be headed toward a hung Parliament, according to the poll. Asked which party they would support in elections, 30 percent of those polled said they would support Bhutto’s party, 25 percent named Sharif’s and 23 percent favored Musharraf’s.
The growing indications that Pakistanis are deeply discontented - and divided - come at a time when other indications of instability are increasing as well. Today two suicide bombers in the southwestern city of Quetta killed five soldiers and wounded eighteen other people.
Attacks continue in Afghanistan as well.
The grim realities of regional and local instability should remind American and British military personnel that they cannot stay in Afghanistan indefinitely. A coherent and effective strategy is more needed now than ever, whether that be “dismantling” the Taliban, negotiating a ceasefire, or simply withdrawing.
The U.S. emphasis on military action for the purpose of political gains in the ideological “war on terror” continues to boggle my mind, and the resurgence of the Taliban is proof positive that the war against Islamist extremism cannot be won with military engagement alone. Political negotiations, as you articulate, are necessary for reconciliation and reconstruction but solutions that reach the level of the everyday individual living in Afghanistan also need to be considered.
One of the primary obstacles to US success in the “war on terror” is the US failure to reconceive the so-called “enemy” outwith the categories of traditional warfare. We are not fighting an enemy that can be defeated bombing outposts, training facilities, freezing funds, etc. As I’ve argued before, if the US wants to win the “war on terror” (or even make considerable gains toward lessing the threat of terrorist attacks in the domestic arena) it must begin to fight the battle for the hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan, the people of Iraq. So far, we’ve done nothing more than bully them beyond the brink of extremism.
And, as you suggest with Pakistan, heeding the demands of the people rather than promoting our own agendas…
And of course, our insistence on treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as very separate entities, instead of looking for ways to help both countries together, doesn’t help move things forward either.