The US should handle the situation in South Asia as though we were defusing a bomb. We need to make slow, careful movements, and we need to pick the right wire to move first.

An article in today’s New York Times suggests that the Bush administration and the military are poised to do the opposite:

President Bush’s senior national security advisers are debating whether to expand the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military to conduct far more aggressive covert operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The debate is a response to intelligence reports that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are intensifying efforts there to destabilize the Pakistani government, several senior administration officials said.

Move the wrong wire, and the unexpected might happen:

The consequences of the possible escalation are extremely unpredictable. The alleged al-Qaeda militants are embedded in complex tribal networks in a remote mountainous area. Military action could inflict severe casualties and damage to these traditional communities and inflame anti-American sentiment across Muslim Pakistan. It might accelerate the disintegration of the US-backed Musharraf dictatorship which currently possesses nuclear weapons. Musharraf and the Pakistani military have steadfastly opposed direct American intervention for the past five years.

The theory of intervention rests on the premise that covert action will succeed. Some of the most infamous military debacles in American history, however, resulted from poorly conceived efforts at “covert action.” The attempted Iranian hostage rescue of 1980 and the Black Hawk Down incident of 1993 are only two examples of how plans go awry, with deadly consequences. History suggests that we should carefully consider the risks of military action, even on a small scale. If we go in, we will most likely be caught; we may provoke serious violence, leading to American deaths; any such disaster would not only inflame American public opinion, but also large segments of the Muslim world.

What, then, is the right wire to move? Firstly, we need to zoom out a little. If nothing else, I hope that high-level State Department officials - preferably Rice herself - are on the phone with India’s government every day. A destabilized Pakistan, along with an increased US military presence, will make India nervous. I hope we’re keeping lines of communication open.

Secondly, we need to figure out a way to wrap up our operations in Afghanistan. We have not, thus far, been serious about achieving progress there, and our continued presence in Afghanistan is destabilizing the entire region. If we cannot generate a coherent strategy to broker national reconciliation, offer legitimate economic alternatives to poppy cultivation, and increase security for ordinary people, we should leave Afghanistan. This will reduce our need to play dangerous games with Pakistan. Whatever else, we must not maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan, or we will continue to face regional dilemmas.

Thirdly, within Pakistan we must cut off our ties to Musharraf. Propping up a dictator while at the same time using his weakness as an excuse to expand our military operations in South Asia simply makes no sense. We cannot complain about destabilization in Pakistan when it is our ally himself who is destabilizing the country. As Bill Richardson (who is not my candidate for president) suggested, we should cut military aid to Musharraf and ask him to step aside. This means taking a risk - but not nearly so great a risk as the ones our alliance with him are driving us to take.

Fourthly, we must be clear when we talk about the situation in Pakistan. Are we talking about Al Qaeda? The Taliban? Al Qaeda “affiliates”? The tendency to collapse all “unfriendly” elements in South Asia into a monolithic Al Qaeda has damaged our ability to operate with sophistication in the region. Raising the specter of Al Qaeda not only needlessly spooks Americans, it also erases the subtleties we need to know in order to respond effectively to complex situations.

Finally, we should organize regional talks between India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Everyone needs to be on the same page, and we need to listen to their input carefully. With the stakes so high, we cannot leave any avenue to peace unexplored.

South Asia looks more and more like a ticking bomb, but we have substantial power to affect what happens there. We need to keep our wits about us, and we need to abandon the failed strategies of Cold War-style American foreign policy: escalate, escalate, escalate. Instead, we need to anticipate consequences in advance, and as Churchill said, do a little more jaw-jaw and a little less war-war.

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