|
|
The U.S.’s Attempts to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation Have Caused
|
|
|
John Mueller has often gone against conventional wisdom. As the Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at The Ohio State University, he has published an array of articles and books on The declining significance of war as he explains in his book Remnants of War; The incredible overreaction to national security threats, especially the threat of terrorism and how it has harmed the country is addressed in his most recent book, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We believe Them; and his current work, how the U.S.’s attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation have been counterproductive, will be published as a book next year.
Mueller’s argument in his current work, as outlined in an article in The National Interest last year, is as follows:
- The “obsessive quest to Control nuclear proliferation — particularly since the end of the Cold War — has been substantially counterproductive and has often inflicted dire costs.” Examples include the Iraq War, which was sold by the Bush Administration as the only preventative act to keep nuclear and other WMDs from Saddam Hussein’s weakened state of Iraq. The sanctions in the 1990s which led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children could also be included, as well as a potential conflict with Iran.
- While the fear that terrorists themselves would obtain atomic weapons and/or other WMD has taken root in the national security community, it is “highly improbable” that either a rogue nation would give these terrorist groups these weapons, nor that the groups themselves could develop them. If a nation gave these weapons to a terrorist group, and the source was discovered, “international retribution could be unfathomably fierce.” It is also incredibly unlikely that a rogue group could obtain all the necessary materials to create such a weapon, or gain access to the facilities to put it together, and then control it thereafter. Even when examining the supposed evidence that Al-Qaeda is seeking out the bomb, it is clear that they haven’t even come close to the first steps.
- Countries that do obtain nuclear weapons do so either for prestige (France) or deterrence (Israel, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea). While Mueller emphasizes that he does not like nuclear proliferation, and is clear the he considers “dissuading more countries from obtaining nuclear weapons to be quite a good idea and preventing terrorists from getting them to be an even better one,” many of the actions performed in the name f nuclear proliferation have caused more harm than good. While we would rather Iran did not have such weapons, there is no reason to believe that if they got them, they would actually use them.
The Seminal: Do the politicians and security experts who perpetuate the importance of the issue of nuclear proliferation really fear it, or do they just see it as a beneficial issue for themselves?
John Mueller: They really are genuinely afraid. When the issue is raised, people get hysterical — but countries that do get the bomb never use it. Even “unstable” countries like China at least so far have not used theirs. They basically use it for deterrence and prestige. Sure it would be nice if they didn’t get the weapons, but if the policies to prevent them from getting them cause hundreds to thousands of deaths, then the strategy must be rethought.
The Seminal: Do you think that these so-called “unstable” countries are more apt to try to get nuclear weapons due to the actions of the U.S. and other developed countries in the name of non-proliferation?
John Mueller: If that includes real or assumed threats — it is hardly surprising that these countries may feel the need to get nuclear weapons. the best way to reduce their incentive is to not threaten them. An example of this is putting Iran in the “Axis of Evil.” After Iraq we basically have been saying to Iran, “You’re Next.” In 2003 John Bolton said about Iran, “Take a Number.” So Iran’s reaction isn’t surprising.
The Seminal: Are there any major threats to our security or issues of concern to America;s safety that we are under-reacting to?
John Mueller: No. Since World War Two we have consistently over-exaggerated threats. Nasser was another Hitler. Sukarno was another Hitler. Qaddafi, Khomeini, and of course Saddam Hussein have all been called the next Hitler. None of them are good people, but to put them into the same class as Hitler is absurd.
The Seminal: What about Chemical Weapons or Biological Weapons?
John Mueller: Chemical weapons are not really WMD. Despite the view of them, only 7/10 of 1% of World War One deaths were caused by chemical weapons. They are very unstable and unpredictable. Biological weapons, in most cases, are very difficult to work with and control. To think that some rogue groups will be able to successfully use them when developed countries still don’t view them as viable weapons, is unrealistic.
The Seminal: Is there a sensible approach to controlling Nuclear Weapons and other threats?
John Mueller: We should definitely keep an eye on biological developments and scientific knowledge in those arenas. There should also be more on the ground policing of chemical plants and other sites of concern. We can use normal safety precautions to address them. You don’t leave dynamite lying around, there is control over guns — that kind of thing.
















DISCUSSION
2 RESPONSES to “The U.S.’s Attempts to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation Have Caused
More Harm Than Good: Interview with John Mueller”