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Afghanistan: The Poppy Problem |
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Why?
The report’s authors say they are two key factors to explain the countrywide reduction in poppy production.
One reason is strong political and religious leadership, particularly in the eastern province of Nangahar, for pressuring farmers not to grow the crop.
The other is the drought this year, which led to a large-scale crop failure in the north and north-west of the country.
Which of those two reasons seems stronger to you? “Pressure” - with unspecified effects - mainly in one province, or drought, whose effects can be measured more thoroughly? My money’s on drought. I think the UN mentioned the “pressure” just to toss everyone a bone - hell, six months ago the UN was predicting that this year’s crop would come close to last year’s record levels, and wasn’t waxing too optimistic about the efforts of local leadership to stomp out production. Maybe the crops just failed.
Also, the center of opium production in Afghanistan, Helmand province, is a place where we appoint former Taliban commanders as local governors. Is that the kind of “local pressure” that will stop cultivation?
As for eradication, the UN attempts to stay neutral.
Another way of reducing poppy production is eradication of the crop.
However, the report says there was a dramatic reduction in crop eradication - down to 25% compared with last year.
This is often a dangerous job, inflaming locals as their harvest is ruined, and a number of Afghans were killed while doing this work.
They’re damn right it’s dangerous - it’s not just Afghans who don’t want to participate in eradication efforts, it’s our own Marines. Military commanders, who rightly fear alienating the local population if they destroy crops, put our troops in a catch-22: allow the crops to remain, and come up against firepower purchased with opium money further down the road; or destroy the crops and face immediate danger. It’s all part of the shortsighted strategy in Afghanistan, says Barnett Rubin:
An expert on Afghanistan’s drug trade, Barnett Rubin, complained that the Marines are being put in such a situation by a “one-dimensional” military policy that fails to integrate political and economic considerations into long-range planning.
“All we hear is, not enough troops, send more troops,” said Rubin, a professor at New York University. “Then you send in troops with no capacity for assistance, no capacity for development, no capacity for aid, no capacity for governance.”
This whole debate about opium also underscores how much we’ve misunderstood the Taliban by sensationalizing them. In so many ways (but not all), they’re like a mafia; that’s particularly true when we read about their “protection fees” and “taxes” on opium growers that let the Taliban walk away with drug money to the tune of $100, $200, even $400 million last year, according to some. Rubin is right; more troops is not the answer. Better strategies are the next step: killing fewer civilians, adopting integrated solutions to military/development issues, and broader diplomatic engagement throughout the region.
talaban? money? poppy crops?no oil just great land for an oil pipe line..shucks you almost had me beliveing that poppy shit..whens the pipes going in?..thats a life time guard job..lol.