Reading articles about Pakistan on the BBC's website these days brings up a link to this article in the sidebar–a constant reminder of Musharraf's tenuous position as Pakistan's president. And yet, almost two months after Pakistan's long-awaited parliamentary elections, Musharraf is still president and no serious opposition to his rule has risen out of the popular anti-Musharraf sentiment voiced at the polls.

In the international arena, Musharraf's power doesn't appear to be dwindling. Pakistan's Dawn reports that Musharraf has been working to secure a new free trade agreement with China, to boost commercial and economic ties between the two Asian nations.

But domestically, two obstacles to Musharraf's future in Pakistan's politics are looming large. The first, which was largely responsible for keeping Musharraf in power for so long, is the future of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. Speaking to the BBC, former PM–and key player in forming the current coalition government–Nawaz Sharif has claimed Musharraf's importance in Pakistani politics is dwindling, saying

"He doesn't have any support in Washington, maybe a few people in the administration still think that he should be allowed to stay as president, whether he can do anything or not."

Though the relationship the United States forges with the new government will play an integral role in shaping Musharraf's future, the supreme court justices Musharraf deposed will play a more important role in either overlooking the illegitimacy of Musharraf's presidency (because I doubt they will ever outrightly accept it as legitimate) or generating public outcry against Musharraf's presidency.

The plan for restoring the deposed judges–who had been held under house arrest until recently–is currently on the National Assembly's to-do list but has yet to be settled within the coalition. Until the judges return and determine their stance on Musharraf's presidency, Musharraf will stay, but keep watching those justices, as their moves will set the tone–and decide the future–of Musharraf's presidency.

With several sources putting the opposition in the lead in early stages of counting, and several international observers applauding the efficiency and impartiality of today's elections, it looks as if Pakistan's much-anticipated general election has gone off without as much chaos as we anticipated. Were the elections today really "free and fair," as those in observance assert? Or must we read between the lines (votes) to find the hidden story of Pakistan's election day? What does low voter turn out mean for the nation's future? And is an opposition victory another play in Musharraf's game?

That Pakistan's elections went off with only nine deaths today does not mean Pakistan and its political leaders should be praised, though. As Senator Joseph Biden said on NPR this morning, despite the relative calm, Pakistan's elections were not free from chicanery today. In a country that caters to illiterate voters by including party symbols on the ballots, some of today's ballots replaced the roaring lion of former PM Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) with a timid pussy cat, for example. (Note: Some U.S. sources site Sharif's symbol as a tiger; I believe they are in error.)

Pre-election violence and the threat of violence seem to have contributed to today's low voter turn out, and voting behavior has been manipulated in other way as well. Limitations on the media prior to the election undoubtedly hampered the democratic process and prevented politicians and their parties from effectively mounting a national campaign against Musharraf. With party politics alive and well in Pakistan, it seems unlikely such an attempt would've been successful but without free media, how do we know? In some cases, the government employed less peaceful means of suppression. (And the extent to which such tactics were employed may never be know.)

For now, though, it looks as though the opposition have dealt a severe blow to Musharraf's party (as well as to the Bush administration who strongly supported Musharraf's rule?) and as if Pakistan may well be on its way toward the restoration of civilian rule. Unfortunately, with Musharraf (backed by the army, for now) at the helm and an unruly opposition infested Parliament in play, the road to democracy remains riven with potholes and possible set-backs. While the PLM(N) may see their (predicted) victory as a cause for celebration, observers from the West should not be so eager to rest on their morals of democracy. America, in particular must re-assess its relationship with Pakistan and redirect its military relationship with the nation's unpopular militaristic president toward the people who might otherwise be inclined to side with America.

Now that Musharraf has seemingly allowed the polls to play out, it's time for America to reassess. But that reassessment could take many forms.

There's plenty of information to process and I have several questions to ask, but this is an Open Thread. What are your thoughts on today's election results? Looking forward, looking back, did the elections live up to your expectations? How will Musharraf proceed in the face of an elected opposition? And what should the U.S. do now that the results have started to come in?

The question regarding Monday's general election in Pakistan was never whether there would rigging; the question was always about how intense the rigging would be. Human Rights Watch now predicts "massive" rigging, and it appears the military have already moved their forces into place to prevent (or at least curtail) post-election violence.

Rigging will not secure greater power for Musharraf but will only undermine the power he currently holds. With no clear party or political leader able to secure a majority of the country's votes and wide-spread disagreement and factionalism between groups (which would prevent the institution of a secure coalition-based government), Musharraf will be able to maintain his hold on power without lifting a finger.

With Mister "Ten Percent" Zardari at the head of Bhutto's People's Party, there is a slim chance the party would be able to carry a majority outside Bhutto's home province of Sindh. Following Bhutto's death and the nepotistic passing of the party's reigns to Bhutto's son via her widower, the PPP lacks the national popularity it needs to carry a national electoral victory. The problem the PPP might have posed (after Bhutto discontinued her power-sharing negotiations with Musharraf and before her assassination) to Musharraf has all but evaporated. (Some, like Christine Fair of Rand Corp., even say it never existed.)

Outside of Sindh, the situation is uncertain. The unanimous support the PPP thinks it deserves after Bhuto's assassination doesn't seem to exist elsewhere, and historically the party has never held sway in some provinces. The chances of having to accept a transparent verdict that advocates his resignation seems unlikely as no clear victor will emerge after Monday's voting.

Therefore, if Musharraf allows the polling to proceed without interference, the population will demonstrate that none of the parties nor their leaders has the ability to unite the nation, carry a majority or threaten Musharraf's control. Massive election rigging is, in fact, the only way Musharraf's power can be undermined for the people will only rise up in unison to oppose Musharraf's interference with their right to vote.

By holding free and fair elections, Musharraf stands to gain the credibility he currently lacks. Not only will he be able to turn to the West and say "See, Pakistan is on the road to Democracy" but out of the inter-party disputes that will arise during the process of forming a coalition government, Musharraf will also prove that he is the only man capable of holding Pakistan together.

Democracy is in Pakistan's best interests. It is the best way to curb terrorism and the only way to protect its coveted position as America's most important ally in the "war on terror." Election rigging will lead to a more massive outburst of violence and discontent than Pakistan faced following Bhutto's death, and with Musharraf's attention turned toward keeping the people at peace, all efforts to fight terrorism will come to a screeching halt, leading to an undesired chain of events involving more military rule and more US military intervention on Pakistan's side of the border with Afghanistan. The outcome would not be pretty and would not be an effective way to stay in power.

Finally, it seems Musharraf and democracy might be on the same side; either they both will be victorious after today's votes are counted or the fate of Pakistan will be irreconcilably lost in the mires of domestic and international crises.

It's going to be a short one music-wise tonight. With FISA and Donna Edwards today, I'm pretty much blogged out…

The premise: Free music downloads from your phone. You can listen to them on your computer too. Music from all the labels. Not bad huh?

The Reality: Probably too good to be true.

From CNET:

London-based company Omnifone today announced the launch of MusicStation Max — a worldwide mobile music download service that offers 'free' unlimited downloads of music from the four major labels (Sony BMG, Universal, EMI and Warner), directly to mobile phones over the air. In the UK, Omnifone will offer a catalogue of 1.5 million tracks — a solid figure, but not one that will cover the entire catalogue of each major label.

The problems seem immediately obvious. For one, the tracks will be "protected" with DRM. This likely means no transferring to your iPod, no CD burning, no freedom. DRM has killed ideas like this in the past, and labels are starting to abandon it altogether. Seems like Omnifone is behind the times.

Second, the music will be downloaded to your computer using Mac or PC software. This should be a red flag to anyone. Do you like the music player you use now, whether it be iTunes, Winamp, or what have you? If so, why would you switch to whatever piece of software Omnifone devises? Special software to listen to the tracks you've downloaded with this service might be a deal killer for many.

And of course, you'll probably have to pay something for the mobile data bandwidth you use to download this music.

It's hard to compete with free. Obtaining music through file sharing is incredibly easy. Any product that puts barriers in front of users won't be as widely accepted as it could be. Throw in DRM, special software, and mobile data charges and you start to see a product that won't take off.

To make it in the brave new world of digital music, you have to compete with free. You have to offer something file sharing doesn't. It could be higher quality tracks, bonus artwork, or even the option of donating to your favorite band (like Radiohead). It just needs to be something.

Looks like Omnifone might not have what it takes to compete.

Compared to John McCreary who recently published this critical assessment of Pakistani politics, I am a newbie, a freshman, a novice when it comes to foreign policy analysis. To put things in perspective, according to his bio, Mr. McCreary has been in the intelligence biz for longer than I've been alive, meaning his analysis of intelligence issues—like the currently debated US relationship with Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf—should be broader and deeper than my fresh-faced opining. Yet, Mr. McCreary's recent essay "Musharraf's Last Jam", shows little evidence of the seasoned perspective one might expect him to offer. Blaming the internal divisions that prevent Pakistan's political stability, McCreary overlooks the role of U.S. aid in undermining the possibility for such stability and the side-effects of the persistent blind faith with which the United States has offered aid to Pakistan for over fifty years.

McCreary is right to argue that U.S. policymakers have little, if any, understanding of Pakistan's "ethnic fissures" (though I take issue with his sweeping claim that "Pakistan is one huge 'tribal area'"), and he is probably right to argue that "Pakistan’s military is an agent of extremist views, not a bulwark against terrorism". However, in assessing the U.S. relationship with Pervez Musharraf, McCreary overlooks the fact that despite its ethnic fissures and the threat of extremism, the United States' relationship with Pakistan has been in existence (with a few instances of exception–e.g., war with India, nuclear tests, etc.) for over fifty years. In that time, there have been elections, coups, political overthrows, riots, wars and extremism, yet the United States has continued to support Pakistan with military and economic aid, and McCreary's analysis gives me no reason to believe that the U.S. relationship with Pakistan will change after Musharraf's fall.

Pakistan's former prime minister and leader of the Pakistan People's Party was assassinated during a campaign rally in Rawalpindi today. Details are still sketchy, but it appears a gunman shot Bhutto, then detonated a suicide bomb, leading to the deaths of at least a dozen individuals. Bhutto was rushed to a local hospital where doctors tried to revive her but were unsuccessful. She was pronounced dead at 18:16 local time.

People in Pakistan have responded to the news of Bhutto's death with mixed emotions. Her political opponent Nawaz Sharif expressed sadness, calling her death a "tragedy for the entire nation." Others have expressed anger, and the police used tear gas in Peshawar to breakup a demonstration of angry Bhutto supporters. This bombing was the second attack against Bhutto's life since she returned to Pakistan in October, yet Bhutto was determined to continue her campaign.

No one has claimed responsibility for the attack, but all parties seem to be pointing their fingers at extremists. A close aid to Musharraf has blamed Islamist extremists and U.S. President Bush, in his recent appearance, blamed extremists and praised Bhutto for her dedication to promoting democracy in Pakistan–despite the apparent risks to her life. Bhutto's assassination raises doubts about whether general elections will continue as planned in January and the United Nations Security Council will be meeting for emergency consultations "to discuss the situation in Pakistan after the killing."

Our condolences go out to the nation of Pakistan and to the friends and family members whose loved ones were lost or injured in today's attack. The Seminal will be posting new details as they become available, but more importantly, this is an open forum to discuss recent events in Pakistan. Share your thoughts below.

The front-page of today's The New York Times (online) has a lengthy article assessing the failures of U.S. military aid to Pakistan. It states:

After the United States has spent more than $5 billion in a largely failed effort to bolster the Pakistani military effort against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, some American officials now acknowledge that there were too few controls over the money. The strategy to improve the Pakistani military, they said, needs to be completely revamped.

There are several problems at the heart of the U.S. program's failure (e.g.,it is ineffective against terrorism, it helped/s to prop up Musharraf's military regime, it makes the world less stable), but the majority of the problems stem from the lack of supervision or accountability attached to U.S. aid; there are no procedures in place to make sure the aid to Pakistan is either being directed toward its intended purposes or being used most efficiently. As a result, "Bush administration and military officials said they believed that much of the American money was not making its way to frontline Pakistani units," the New York Times reports. As a result, the officials contend, "Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban."

While several other media outlets (like the BBC) have picked up the Times' story, these assertions—that U.S. military aid toward Pakistan has not be used to "fight terror"—are not "news" by any means. In fact, authors on this site have made similar claims in the past. At the end of August, making reference to a well-researched article published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I wrote:

In a report (full .pdf available here) published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dr. Frederic Grare states that nearly all of the aid given to Pakistan has not been used to fight insurgents, rather, Musharraf has directed funds toward upping Pakistan’s defenses against its neighboring India. This little-known facts seems to suggest that Musharraf is manipulating not only funds but also the perceived threat and unruliness of insurgents—drumming up the need for increased/continuing aid.

Despite the availability of the report—free and online—and the reputation of the Carnegie Endowment, it still took the government and the mainstream media to report on this "little known fact".

I appreciate The New York Times for their coverage; their access to all the high-level officials and anonymous diplomats adds great depth to their reporting. Unfortunately, their reporting doesn't explain why the U.S. continues its incredibly problematic aid program to Pakistan. If a lowly grad student blogger has access to such information, why did it take the government officials (and the mainstream media) months to realize the U.S. aid program in Pakistan needs serious revision? And why did it take six months for this information to become "news"?

After months of urging from opposition party leaders and U.S. officials, President Pervez Musharraf has finally removed the military uniform, ceremoniously passing the baton to his U.S.-educated successor, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.

Last week, the Supreme Court, stacked with judges loyal to Musharraf, dismissed the final legal case challenging the legitimacy of Musharraf's re-election and cleared the way for him to resign his army position to become the newly elected civilian president. Musharraf is slated to be sworn in as president on December first.

In many respects, today should mark a great victory for those pushing for Pakistan's return to democratic rule. However, the path by Musharraf restored the civilian presidency to Pakistan taints this accomplishment. Emergency rule was declared, the constitution altered, the Supreme Court deposed and reinstated with pro-Musharraf justices. The media were banned, lawyers and politicians arrested and the people deprived of their civil liberties. If this is what it takes to restore democracy to Pakistan, does the end result really outweigh the means by which it was achieved?

The world has been waiting for Musharraf to step down from his position as army general, but now that he has, little victory for democracy seems to remain. Is celebration in order because Musharraf has finally done what he should've done months ago? Or would celebration simply reward Musharraf for fighting dirty and breaking the law to get what he wanted? Musharraf's resignation offers a mixed bag, if you ask me, and I'll tell you why, after the jump.

Over the weekend, The New York Times published an article on the relationship between U.S. President Bush and Pakistan's General Musharraf ("Bush Failed to See Musharraf's Faults", Nov. 18, 2007). According to the article, George Bush considers Pervez Musharraf not only an ally in the "war on terror" but also "a friend." As a result, critics contend, Bush has often failed to see Musharraf's short-comings. Colloquially termed the "Bush-Mush relationship", there is no doubt that Bush's personal affinity for the military leader/dictator has continually clouded his foreign policy judgment.

However, Bush is not the first president who has felt a "special" relationship with the president of Pakistan. In 1971, Henry Kissinger (then National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State) made similar comments about President Nixon's relationship with Pakistan's President Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. As summarized in a conversation memorandum (.pdf) from the National Security Archives,

“In all honesty, Dr. Kissinger pointed out, the President has a special feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life.”

Facing a crisis in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)–considered a genocide or selective genocide by some (including U.S. military personnel in the area [.pdf])–Nixon and his foreign policy team were hesitant to do anything that might alienate West Pakistan, with whom the U.S. had strong ties. However, a strong argument can be made that close ties with Pakistan's president clouded U.S. foreign policy judgment in this instance as well.

Although The New York Times reports that Bush is now distancing himself from Pervez Musharraf, and that the relationship was one of convenience rather than true friendship, the similarities between these close ties with foreign leaders and bungled foreign policies seems striking (and too similar for me to pass up, I had to share!).

What do you think, Seminal Readers, is there a lesson to be learned from history? Is there room for personal relationships in foreign policy? Do close ties (with political leaders) help or hurt U.S. Foreign Policy? Should the Bush-Mush relationship be saved or slaughtered? How should we respond to emergency rule and international crises (when we aren't invited to interfere)?

Thoughts, comments, opinions, and insights are welcome below.

Since the state of emergency was declared in Pakistan last Saturday, I have been silently milling over the many possibilities and potential outcomes of this move by Musharraf. After my initial shock (followed by depression, remorse and a bit of guilt) subsided, I started to contemplate how the various "major players" should respond.

First, I started to consider how should the U.S. respond. Should it stop giving Pakistan millions in aid? Should it retake control over how said aid is distributed (rather than writing Musharraf a check–for $100 million each month–and being done with it)? Unilateral military action doesn't enter my vocabulary of choices, but if I were Barack Obama, maybe I'd just want to start bombing?

Indeed, as the BBC argues, the declaration of emergency does put the U.S. in a tough spot. As it suggests,

events in Pakistan have forced the president [of the U.S.] to weigh up his two key foreign policy commitments: fighting the "global war on terror" and his promise to spread democracy and freedom.

In the rhetoric, promoting democracy is the reason for commencing the "war on terror", so the two goals should not be antagonistic. How should the U.S. respond to Pakistan where those two goals have been put at odds with one another? In true likeness of this administration's foreign policy activity, the response has been slow, vague and ineffective. The U.S. has continued to supply its promised aid to Pakistan, despite the collapse of (even the most remote pretense for) democracy, the suspension of the constitution and violent crackdowns against the regime's opponents. To quote my fellow Seminal blogger, J-Ro,

Yet, there has been no serious talk about cutting off aid to Pakistan (most of which goes to the military which is run by Musharraf), and Secretary Rice has been wary of speaking out because she might jeopardize the all important global war on terror. Faced with an unpopular dictator using our rhetoric and fear to consolidate his power, the U.S. is poised to do what it has done time and time again, to strongly support an unpopular authoritarian regime with disastrous results.

The signals from the U.S. certainly are mixed. "War on Terror"=good; democracy also=good. Elections=good; emergency rule=bad. But where does one objective end and the other begin? As the International Herald Tribune reports,

In Washington, American officials said that Musharraf should be given more time. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praised the announcement of an election date but called for an end to the state of emergency."The key is to take this in steps," she said on the ABC News program "This Week." "And the first step is to make certain that the state of emergency ends, to make sure that people can compete for free and fair elections for the Parliament."

But "more time" seems to justify the necessity of emergency rule, non? And the longer the U.S. stalls, the more opportunity the rest of the world has to come up with a clearer understanding and better solutions…

Today, the International Crisis Group released a report on the situation called "Winding Back Military Rule in Pakistan". Along with their as always detailed analysis of the situation (likely including elements not considered by the mainstream media in the West, though I admit, I haven't had a chance to read the report fully), the report includes a series of recommendations for the international community. From the International Crisis Group, herewith the recommendations for responding to the imposition of martial law:

1. speak out unequivocally for democracy in Pakistan, rejecting the idea that martial law is needed for stability, and demand a return to constitutional order
2. outline a series of graduated sanctions starting immediately with suspension of high-level talks on military cooperation, suspension of new military training, review of military aid to distinguish what is essential counter-terrorism (CT) help from general assistance, and establishment of performance-based conditionality on all non-CT military assistance until constitutional order is restored
3. follow this up – if Musharraf makes it necessary by not giving up his post as army chief by 15 November when his parliamentary dispensation to hold that post as well as the presidency expires, and does not restore the constitution, release political prisoners, restore the independent judiciary and accept its judgement on the legality of his October 2007 re-election as president, and set a date for elections – with gradually tougher sanctions, including suspension of all non-CT military aid and visa bans for top military and government officials
4. if these steps are not taken within 30 days, restrict non-CT arms sales; freeze officer training abroad and foreign assets of the military and its foundations and businesses; and refuse to accept high-level visits by Pakistani officials for as long as the constitution is not restored and the military holds politicians, lawyers and civil society actors under arrest and otherwise restricts their civic freedoms; also insist that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) be given unrestricted access to prevent torture and abuse in custody; and simultaneously
5. expand aid for education, poverty reduction, healthcare and relief work, channelling money through secular non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

Though the list kind of resembles Joe Biden's plan for Pakistan (as poked fun of by a Foreign Policy blogger), it certainly delineates the priorities the U.S. should take. Democracy takes precedence over the military (and anti-terror efforts), with a bit of promoting education and increasing social welfare thrown into the mix.